Texas Employment Law Update : Texas Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Russell D. Cawyer : Kelly Hart & Hallman Law Firm : Dallas TX Labor Updates

In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case.

In the case, Plaintiff Gross was employed by FBL Financial Group since 1971. In 2001 he held the title of claims administration director. Gross was reassigned in 2003 to the position of claims project coordinator. He was 54 years old.  Many of the job duties Gross previously performed were transferred to a newly created position and that position was given to a female former subordinate of Gross who was in her early 40’s. While Gross and the co-worker received the same compensation, Gross considered his reassignment and reallocation of job responsibilities a demotion. Consequently he filed suit alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At trial, the jury was asked to decide whether age was “a motivating factor” in the decision to reassign and reallocate Gross’s job responsibilities. This permitted the jury to find in Gross’ favor if even one of many reasons for the job changes was Gross’ age. FBL requested a jury instruction that would have only permitted the jury to find for Gross if he showed that the challenged job actions would not have occurred “but for” Gross’ age. The jury found for Gross.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court found that it was improper to charge the jury under “a motivating factor” standard of causation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff asserting an age discrimination claim under a disparate (i.e., intentional) treatment theory must prove that age was the “but for” cause of the challenged employment action and the burden of proof never shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of the age of the plaintiff. 

This is a significant, but perhaps short-lived, win for employers at the Supreme Court. Like other decisions of the Supreme Court that the Democratically-controlled Congress dislikes, expect quick legislation to be proposed to amend the ADEA to reinstate the “motivating factor” standard of causation.

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A federal appellate court with jurisdiction over Texas held that chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) may qualify as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the Centers for Disease Control, CFS is characterized by symptoms including weakness, muscle pain, impaired memory and/or mental concentration, insomnia, and post-exertional fatigue lasting more than 24 hours.  There is no known diagnostic test for CFS and physicians are left to rely on forensically unreliable self-reports of the patient to make this diagnosis.   Notwithstanding this inability to test for or confirm the existence of this "syndrome," the federal court of appeals covering Texas held that CFS might qualify as a disability that an employer must reasonably accommodate. 

In EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., L.P., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of Chevron on an employee's claim that she was discriminated against and denied reasonable accommodation for her chronic fatigue syndrome.

The employee, Lorin Netterville, was first diagnosed with CFS in 1987 while attending school and caring for her children at home.  She received a six-week course of treatment and her symptoms disappeared.  In late-2000 Netterville applied for employment with Chevron and was eventually hired.  As part of the employment process Netterville completed a medical history questionnaire, where she failed to disclose a history of excessive fatigue with work or exercise.

Several years later Netterville was required to work long hours of overtime that included manually packing boxes and moving supplies as part of Chevron's office relocation. Netterville claims she begin to suffer sleep disruptions that included getting no more than 1-2 hours of sleep per night for 6-7 days at a time.  Once a month she claimed she would sleep 17 hours straight.  She also claims she "began to run low-grade fevers and to suffer from headaches, disorientation, pain in her temples, stiff joints, pain in her arms and legs, and numbness in her legs, as well as aphasia and problems with memory, concentration and decision-making at times she was unable to remember even her own son's name."  She became unable to sit or walk for more than thirty minutes at a time, was hypersensitive to light and sound, and experienced episodic crying spells and feelings of social isolation.  Approximately 1 year after her symptoms reoccurred Netterville was living with her sister who assisted her with daily living tasks like shopping, cooking, washing, showering, drying, dressing, and using the bathroom.  This assistance was primarily needed because of excruciating pain in Netterville's arms and morning nausea she experienced.

Netterville's physician suggested that she take a month off from work.  Because Netterville could not afford a month off without pay, she got her doctor to write a note advising for a two week break from work.  When Netterville presented her request to Chevron for the 2 weeks of time off, she inaccurately reported that her symptoms had reappeared 2 years earlier.  Because Netterville was hired by Chevron less than 2 years earlier, the company also began investigating whether Netterville had falsified her medical history questionnaire in addition to considering her leave request.  Ultimately Netterville was given her two weeks of leave.

Netterville's physician conditioned her release to return to work on additional accommodations.  He recommended that she be relocated to an office closer to her home.  Additionally, due to her alleged hand pain and concentration difficulties, the doctor also advised that Netterville needed to be in a job that allowed for alternate typing and reading rather than reading and typing for extended periods of time.  She also needed to be able to take a short nap during her lunch break.  When Netterville made these requests to her supervisor, he remained silent.  She was allowed, however, to return to work, and she was provided the accommodations she requested during her final 4 days at work.  Ultimately, Netterville was terminated for falsifying information on her medical questionnaire.

The EEOC filed a lawsuit on Netterville's behalf.  Relying heavily on EEOC-promulgated regulations and its compliance manual (the EEOC is one of the governmental agency litigants that gets to write the authority it then asks a court to rely on to find in its favor --something no private employer is allowed to do), the court of appeals held that Netterville was entitled to a jury trial on her claims because there were fact issues as to whether Netterville had a disability; whether she was terminated for a disability; and whether Chevron provided reasonable accommodation.

This case is an important reminder that any physical or mental impairment may qualify as a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity. Moreover, the major life activity substantially limited need have no bearing on an employee’s employment or performance of his or her job duties. With the passage of the ADA Amendments Act that substantially broadens the coverage of individuals with disabilities, expect more denials of and reversals of employer summary judgments in ADA cases.

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A recent Wall Street Journal article described the controversy that e-cigarettes are creating.  As Lauren Etter writes,

[E]lectronic cigarettes, [are] the smokeless nicotine products embraced by a growing number of people trying to kick the habit or avoid bans on smoking in public.  Electronic cigarettes typically consist of a metal tube containing an atomizer, a battery and a cartridge filled with liquid nicotine. When a user sucks on an e-cigarette, a light-emitting diode causes the tip to glow and the atomizer turns the liquid nicotine into a vapor -- thus it is called vaping instead of smoking. The vapor can be inhaled and then exhaled, creating a cloud that resembles cigarette smoke but dissipates more quickly and doesn't have the lingering odor.

Etters' article started me thinking about whether employers can or should prohibit electronic cigarettes in the workplace.   I'm not a proponent of anything as addictive as nicotine.  However, could employers realize some increase in productivity by permitting smokers to use electronic cigarettes at work?  Presumably, smokers use their regular breaks as their smoke breaks.  Some employees complain, however, that employers tolerate more frequent and longer breaks for smokers than for non-smokers.   Could employers benefit by allowing employees to satisfy their nicotine fix at their desk or break room rather than taking 20 minutes every hour or two?  Indeed, how is the use of an electronic cigarette meaningfully different from the use of nicotine gum or the morning caffeine fix that employees consume at work?  Are there health benefit savings that employers might enjoy by allowing or even encouraging employees to use e-cigarettes instead of smoking regular cigarettes?

Do existing employer policies prohibiting smoking in the workplace (as well as building codes and local ordinances) prohibit the use of vaping at work?  While courts have historically rejected the argument that nicotine addiction is a disability, the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act and its more expansive definition of disability could call the courts to revisit and closely scrutinize those holdings.  If nicotine addition was recognized as a disability, could employers be required to allows the use of electric cigarettes as a reasonable accommodation?  Would it be difficult for an employer to show the use of an electric cigarette in the workplace is an undue hardship when the employer allows the use of nicotine infused gum or other prescription medicines at work? 

When I started writing this post I was inclined to recommend prohibiting the use of this new technology in the workplace.  After thinking about the answers to the questions I proposed above, I'm not certain I would recommend an employer prohibit the use of electric cigarettes in the workplace.  In the end employers should carefully consider and be able to articulate their legitimate business interest before electing to prohibit the use of electric cigarettes in the workplace.  As of the writing of this post, there are no reported employment court opinions discussing the use of e-cigarettes in the workplace.   With the widening use of this new technology, reported cases are sure to be on the horizon.

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