Texas Employment Law Update : Texas Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Russell D. Cawyer : Kelly Hart & Hallman Law Firm : Dallas TX Labor Updates

Today the Texas Supreme Court held that when an employee is employed by two employers (a staff leasing company and client company in this case) and both employers have workers' compensation insurance, the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions apply to bar negligence claims asserted by the deceased employee's parents.

You can review a copy of the Court's opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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24 Hour Fitness operates health clubs and fitness facilities across the country.  As part of its operations, 24 Hour Fitness employs sales representatives.  As a condition of employment, employees are required to enter into arbitration agreements to arbitrate their employment disputes with their employer.  FLSA claims (i.e., overtime and minimum wage claims) are covered within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  John Carey was a sales representative for 24 Hour Fitness.  He signed a handbook acknowledgment containing the arbitration agreement.  Not only did the arbitration agreement require the arbitration of disputes, it further provided that disputes could not be brought as class actions or in representative capacities.  Unfortunately for the employer, the handbook also included a provision that permitted it to revise, delete or add to the handbook at any time and that it would communicate those changes to the employees through official written notices.  Nothing in the policy precluded the employer from applying changes to the arbitration agreement retroactively. 

After Carey's employment ended, he filed an FLSA collective action seeking unpaid overtime on behalf of all similarly-situated employees.  24 Hour Fitness moved the court to compel arbitration.  Carey, in response, argued that he agreement was illusory because the employer retained the right to unilaterally amend the agreement. 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found against the employer holding that its arbitration agreement was unenforceable.  The Court held that the arbitration agreement was illusory because: 1) 24 Hour Fitness retained the right to alter, amend or changes the policy at any time; 2) the policy did not foreclose the prospect of unilateral amendments to claims existing on or before the amendment; and 3) nothing in the policy precluded the employer from applying any of its changes retroactively.  As a result, 24 Hour Fitness will be left to defend Carey's lawsuit in Court, with a jury, and potentially as a collective action. 

The take-away form the opinion is that regardless of the type of ADR you use (e.g., arbitration, waiver of jury trial), if the agreement is contained in an employee handbook, ensure that the handbook's express contractual disclaimer contained in the handbook (You know, that provision that says nothing contained in this agreement is intended to create an express or implied contract) carves out those ADR procedures and specifically states that such provisions are intended to be contractual in nature; that the employer and employee are bound by such provisions and that neither party may alter or amend the contract unilaterally.  At a minimum, if the employer wants to retain the right to unilaterally amend the policy, it should state that the employer cannot amend it to apply retroactively to claims that existed prior to the amendment and notice to the employee. 

A full copy of Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness is available here. 

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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A new Fifth Circuit case reveals the consequence that can occur when an employer and its managers fail to take harassment complaints seriously; fail to promptly and thoroughly investigate the complaints; and reach conclusions following the investigation that just plain wrong.   In Cherry v. Shaw Coastal Inc., a male employee (Cherry) complained that his immediate male supervisor was making making inappropriate comments of a sexual nature and causing unwanted physical contact. Because I don't want this blog to show up in Google's search results for unsavory topics, I'll let you read the opinion itself the graphic details of the egregious, same-sex sexual harassment that was experienced by Cherry.  Needless to say, it included unwelcome comments of a sexual nature and unwanted touching that the jury concluded amounted to sexual harassment by the male co-worker.

The conduct of was so severe that one of Cherry's co-workers initially complained about what he witnessed.  Cherry also made repeated complaints to the managers in his supervisory chain.  The supervisors receiving the complaints failed forward them to human resources as required by company policy and instead questioned whether the conduct complained of was merely horsing around.  Cherry ultimately went directly to human resources and made a complaint.  Despite the fact that Cherry made an estimated ten complaints, had an eyewitness to the harassment, and text messages demonstrating the unwelcome sexual comments, the company's human resources staff concluded there was "insufficient evidence" to corroborate the complaint.  Cherry and the alleged harasser were placed on different work crews, but Cherry complained that he continued to get "dirty looks" from the alleged harasser.  Finally, six months after the first complaints of harassment occurred, Cherry resigned his employment specifically pointing the on-going harassment and retaliation to which he claimed he he was subjected.

A jury found in favor of the Cherry on the sexual harassment claim but the trial court entered judgment in favor of the company.  On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court.  The Court found that the Company had done enough to avoid a punitive damages finding (i.e., that the company did not act with malice or reckless disregard) because it had a policy against sexual harassment with a complaint procedure and, while not acting promptly, ultimately transferred the harasser to a different crew.

As to liability for the sexual harassment, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the company did not act promptly.  The Court concluded that the human resources department's decision not to act because of "insufficient evidence" could be reasonably interpreted as a failure to take prompt remedial action.  Consequently, the appeals court reversed the judgment in favor of the employer and directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff-employee on the sexual harassment claim.

You can take a few things away from the Cherry opinion:

• Ensure supervisors are trained on their responsibilities under the company's sexual harassment policy and make sure they forward complaints they receive to human resources for investigation;
• Don't conclude there is insufficient evidence of company violations where the complaining employee has eyewitness corroboration and text messages to support his claim;
• Investigate all complaints of alleged harassment promptly.

A full copy of the Court's opinion is available here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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There are a few pockets in the state where lawyers representing employees still vigorously fight the arbitration agreements their clients signed with employers agreeing to arbitrate all disputes. One of the pockets is in El Paso, Texas as evidenced by the number of opinions out of the court of appeals addressing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between employers and employees.

An example of one of these challenges is found in the recent opinion of Mendivil v. Zanios Foods, Inc.  In Mendivil, the plaintiff-employee challenged the arbitration agreement he signed with his employer when he wanted to sue in court under a workers’ compensation retaliation theory. Mendivil challenged the agreement on a variety of grounds including the fact his employer did not promise to arbitrate its disputes with Mendivil; he had to arbitrate his claims in New Mexico rather than El Paso; he had give notice of intent to arbitrate within thirty days of the incident and respond to all correspondence from his employer within ten days or waive arbitration; and he had to pay for one-half of the arbitration fees. In legalese, Mendivil claimed the agreement was illusory and not supported by adequate consideration (because the employer made no return promises) and was legally unconscionable (because it made him arbitrate far away, bear one-half of the arbitration expenses and make requests for arbitration on short time tables). 

The court of appeals considered Mendivil’s challenge to the trial court’s order to arbitrate. The appeals court was persuaded that the agreement was unsupported by adequate consideration because the employer made no promises to Mendivil and that alone was sufficient to warrant reversal of the trial court’s arbitration order.   

The takeaway from this case is twofold. First, an employer that desires to enforce an arbitration programs with its workforce must make sure the agreement is supported by valuable consideration. This is usually accomplished by having the employer make the return promise to arbitrate all of its disputes it has with employees. The mutual promises to arbitrate claims will almost always suffice as adequate consideration to support the arbitration agreement. Second, arbitration is meant to be a meaningful alternative to a judicial forum. Where a party uses the arbitration agreement to impose onerous conditions far more restrictive than would be found in a judicial forum, the court will view the enforceability of the agreement more skeptically. Remember, pigs get fat but hogs get slaughtered.

You can download a full copy of the Court’s opinion in Mendivil v. Zanios Foods, Inc. here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimouslyy held that the ministerial exception bars a federal employment discrimination suit brought by a teacher challenging her church-employer's decision to terminate her employment.  While this holding is limited to religious affiliated employers, it firmly establishes the ministerial exception as a bar to certain employment discrimination claims against religious organizations.

Plaintiff Cheryl Perich was a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School --a school affiliated with the Lutheran Church.  The school had two kinds of teachers --lay and called teachers.  Called teachers were regarding as having been drawn to their vocation by God and had to complete certain religious academic requirements and become "Commissioned" in the Lutheran faith.  Lay teachers were not required to undergo the religious training or ordination requirements.  Moreover, lay teachers were only used when called teachers were unavailable.  Perich stated out as a lay teacher but was asked to, and agreed to become a called teacher.

Perich subsequently developed narcolepsy during the 2004-05 school year and took disability leave.  The school contracted with a substitute teacher to complete the academic year.  When Perich wanted to return to work, the school declined because it had replaced her position with the substitute.  Perich was offered  a paid continuation of her health insurance in return for her resignation. She refused the offer and instead reported to work.  When asked to leave, she refused to leave until she was provided a note confirming she had reported to work. She was later told by the principal that she would likely be fired to which she responded that she had spoken to an attorney and intended to assert her legal rights.  The school terminated her employment for insubordination and disruptive behavior as well as the damaged she allegedly caused to her relationship with the school by threatening to take legal action.

Perich filed a charge of disability discrimination and the EEOC issued a cause finding and filed suit on her behalf against the school claiming that she was fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit.  The church and school defended against the disability claim arguing that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause's (i.e., the provision that precludes the government from passing any law establishing a religion or interfering with the free exercise of religion) ministerial exception prohibited the application of the ADA claim against it because it would undermine the church's decision in who become and remains a minister of the church.  The EEOC argued that the Court should not recognize a ministerial exception.  The Court rejected the Commission's arguments holding that to do so would effectively allow the government decide for the church who could act on its behalf as a minister.

Significant aspects of the case included that the teacher was ordained by the church as a minister.   While most of the duties she performed were similar to non-ordained teachers, she also taught religion class, led students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, took her students to a weekly school-wide chapel service and led the chapel service twice a year.  Both the church/school and the teacher held the teacher out as a minister with a role distinct from most of its members; her role required a significant degree of religious training and a formal process of commissioning and that her job duties reflected a role in conveying the church's message and carrying out its mission.  Because she qualified as a minister, the Court concluded that the EEOC's action challenging the decision to terminate her employment would be tantamount to dictating to the church who could and could not be a minister on the church's behalf.  As such, the ADA claim was barred by the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and ministerial exception. 

The quick takeaways from the case are:

• Ministerial exception exists;
• It only applies to religious groups and organizations (although what qualifies as a religious group or organization is unclear);
• The ministerial exception does not only protect religious organizations from suits alleging religious discrimination;
• Ministerial exception applies to internal decisions of the religious organization in deciding who to select or retain as a minister;
• Ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation but it is unclear how far the exception can be extended;
• Holding is limited to cases where minister brings an employment discrimination claim challenging a church's decision to fire her.

It will be left to the lower court's to flesh out the outer boundaries of the ministerial exception to determine who qualifies as a minister and what decisions can be said to interfere with the religious body's free exercise of religion.

You can download a full copy of the Court's opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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The federal False Claims Act (aka Qui Tam statute) provides a cause of action for an employee who is retaliated against for attempting to prevent its employer from making fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.  An open issue in the Fifth Circuit (the federal court of appeals covering appeals from Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi) was how quickly a plaintiff had to file a lawsuit for retaliation under the statute. In Riddle v. Dyncorp Inter. Inc., the Court clarified that the appropriate statute of limitations for an FCA retaliation claim in Texas is two years.  

In Riddle, the plaintiff alleged that he was a senior employment manager for Dyncorp until he was terminated.  Prior to his termination, Dyncorp, according to Riddle, contracted with the federal government to create a database but took no meaningful steps to fulfill the obligation.  He claims that when he protested the inaction, he was marginalized at work and eventually fired.  He filed his complaint against Dyncorp and three employees 178 days after his termination.  The company moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that a 90 day statute of limitations (borrowed from the Texas Whistleblower Act) applied to the claim and was untimely.  The trial court accepted this argument and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and concluded that a two year statute of limitations applied to the claim.  When a federal cause of action fails to set a statute of limitations, the court is required to look at the most closely applicable state law claim and apply its statute of limitations.  Here, the court of appeals had to determine whether the 90 days statute of limitations from the Texas Whistleblower Act or the general two year statute of limitations applying to personal injury claims and is the default limitations period under Texas law applied.  Given that the Texas Whistleblower Act applies only to public employees and requires the exhaustion of any administrative appeals processes of the public employer, the Court found a sufficient number of differences between the FCA and TWA such that the 90 day limitations period was inapplicable.  Instead, the Court held that an FCA retaliation claim is more closely akin to a Sabine Pilot wrongful discharge claim (i.e., termination for refusal to perform an illegal act) because it is available to all employees (except those covered by contract or CBA) and has no administrative prerequisites that must be exhausted before bringing suit.  The Sabine Pilot claim has a two year statute of limitations.  Consequently, the Court concluded that the two year limitations period was appropriate, reversed the trial court's dismissal, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

A full copy of the Court's opinion is available here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer. 

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In reading a recent Fifth Circuit opinion affirming the dismissal of a employee's claim of racial harassment involving the display of a noose, I am reminded of Mark Twain's quote, "If you tell the truth, you don't have to remember anything."  Its good advice to live by and even better advice for deponents and witnesses.

Nickey Brown brought a Title VII racial harassment claim against his employer, Oil States Skagit Smatco, alleging that his co-workers made racially derogatory remarks about him, subjected him to offensive racial graffiti and displayed a noose in his workplace.  These allegations often have EEOC Cause Finding and large financial settlement written all over them.  However, in this case, the district court dismissed Brown's claims.  Why?  Brown provided materially inconsistent explanations for why he left his employment with his employer.

Not only was Brown a party to his Title VII action against his employer, he was also a party in a personal injury lawsuit.  In a deposition for his personal injury lawsuit he testified that he left employment because he was in pain all the time due to the injuries sustained in the automobile accident.  However, in this racial harassment case he testified that he left his job because of the severe harassment he endured.  Because of the directly inconsistent testimony, the trial court sanctioned Brown with dismissal of his lawsuit.  The Fifth Circuit upheld this decision.  You can read a full copy of the opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas heard oral arguments in an interesting case regarding the outer limits of the attorney-client privilege with respect to a workers' compensation insurance carrier attorney's communications with its insured.  The communications at issue were made between the carriers and the insured/employer during the administrative proceeding before the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission over the compensability of a workers' compensation claim.  The case is styled In re XL Specialty Insurance Company and Cambridge Integrated Services Group Inc. (No. 10-0960).

At issue is a trial court's order that the workers' compensation insurance carriers turn over, in a civil lawsuit over the allegedly bad faith denial of workers' compensation benefits, communications they had with their insured/employer during the course of the underlying administrative litigation over the compensability of the workers' compensation claim. 

This case could have important ramifications for the Texas law of attorney-client privilege of communications between an insured and its insurance company's counsel.  Employers, and their attorneys, routinely communicate with insurance companies about the status of potential and pending claims.  Similarly, counsel for insureds routinely provide litigation updates about the potential strengths, weaknesses, potential exposure and likely outcomes on pending litigation.  These types of communications are normally treated as confidential and subject to the attorney-client privilege under the common legal interest doctrine (i.e., the privilege extends communications between parties or attorneys that share a common legal interest).  And while the case before the court is slightly different from the way EPL claims are handled because the insured/employer is not party (and is therefore a third-party) to the underlying lawsuit, the Court's pronouncements regarding the limits of the attorney-client privilege could have wide reaching effects on the manner in which employers communicate with their insurance carriers about pending claims.

We'll have more from this case when the Court renders its opinion in the case. 

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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This week the Fifth Circuit held that a cause of action exists for hostile work environment under the ADEA –the first such express holding in the Circuit.  In Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, the plaintiff filed a hostile work environment and constructive discharge claim against the employer.

During the brief two months of employment, Dediol claimed that his direct supervisor repeated referred to him by profane, derogatory names invoking his age; made offensive remarks about his religious beliefs; threatened him both economically with the loss of his job and with physical threats of violence and intimidation. When Dediol’s requested transfer to another department was denied by his supervisor, he told the company’s management that he could no longer take the abuse and ceased reporting for work. The employer terminated his employment for job abandonment. He filed a charge of discrimination; received a right to sue letter and file a hostile work environment suit based on age, religion, harassment and constructive discharge.

In the first holding of its kind in the Fifth Circuit, the panel held that a plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim based on age discrimination under the ADEA could be advanced in court. In setting out the parameters for such claim, the Court borrowed liberally from Title VII hostile work environment jurisprudence.   The court held that the plaintiff must show that 1) he is over age 40; 2) the employee was subject to harassment, either through works or actions, based on age; 3) the nature of the harassment was such that it created an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and 4) there is some basis for liability on the part of the employer. In determining whether the harassment is intimidating, hostile or offensive, the conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.

Having concluded that an ADEA hostile work environment based on age exists in this Circuit, the Court examined the record and concluded that genuine factual disputes existed as to each of Dediol’s causes of action. The court reversed the trial court and sent the case back for further consideration –including, potentially, a full trial on the merits.

You can download the complete opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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In a recent case out of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, a federal judge entered summary judgment for the City of Fort Worth in an FLSA overtime case filed by four former police officers.   

In Clark v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, four retired City of Fort Worth police officers filed a FLSA putative collective action seeking to represent a class of current and former officers for unpaid overtime they claimed they worked when they provided security services for third-parties leasing City properties (e.g., events at the City owned convention center).  According to the plaintiffs, these off-duty hours providing security for sporting events and concerts on City property (but for non-City events) should have been added to their regular official law enforcement hours with any work over forty hours per week being paid at overtime rates.  The City moved for summary judgment arguing that the special detail exemption excluded those hours worked for the separate employers and that no overtime was due and owing.  There are only six reported cases involving the special detail exemption so this opinion is important if for no other reason than to add to the scant case law on the issue.

The special detail exemption applies to law enforcement and fire fighter employees who voluntarily perform work for separate and independent employers.  Under the exemption, the hours voluntarily worked for the separate and independent employer are excluded from the officer's hours worked on behalf of the the primary employer for FLSA overtime purposes.  In a well-reasoned opinion, the federal judge presiding over the case, concluded that the City has established its affirmative defense that the hours sued on were exempt under the special detail exemption and entered a judgment in favor of the City. 

You can download a copy of the Court's opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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In an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals holds that Title VII's damages cap apply on a "per party" basis rather than on "per claim."  In Black v. Pan American, the Plaintiff, Carleen Black, prevailed on her Title VII and TCHRA claims of sex discrimination and retaliation.  The jury awarded Black $3.45M in back pay and compensatory damages.  Prior to entry of judgment, the trial court reduced the jury's award to $500,000 representing $300,000 in back pay and $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Title VII damage caps ($200,000 in this case based on the size of the employer) should be applied on a "per claim" rather than on a "per party" basis.  If the Plaintiff's argument was accepted, her judgment would include $600,000 for capped compensatory and punitive damages rather than $200,000 because she prevailed on three capped claims.  In holding that Title VII's damage caps apply "per party" rather than "per claim," the Court first noted that the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Courts of Appeals had held that caps apply per party.  The Court then examined the statute and concluded that "the plain language of Section 1981a(b)'s cap applies to each party in an action." Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment that capped Black's compensatory and punitive damages at $200,000.

You can download a complete copy of the Court's opinion in Black v. Pan American Laboratories, LLC here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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In an issue of first impression, the El Paso Court of Appeals has held that the Assisted Living Facility Licensing Act creates a private right of action for an employee who has filed a complaint, grievance of providing information in good faith relating to personal care services of the assisted living facility.

In Emeritus Corp. v. Blanco, Blanco was Interim Executive Director for an Assisted Living Facility in El Paso.  During her employment, she complained about inadequate staffing and training to her superiors.  Ultimately, Blanco tendered her two week notice of resignation.  Shortly before her scheduled final day of employment, she sent  an email to seven Emeritus employees and supervisors further detailing her concerns that patient care and safety she attributed to the lack of staff and inadequate training.  Her resignation was accepted the following day.

She brought suit alleging that she had been retaliated against and constructively discharged because of her complaints about patient care and safety.  A jury returned a verdict in her favor for lost wages and mental anguish in the amount of $128,500.  Emeritus appealed, in part, arguing that the ALFLA provided no private cause of action for retaliation because the Act, while expressly prohibiting retaliation, provided not right to bring a lawsuit.

In reaching its decision, appellate court reviewed a variety of the statutes under the Health & Safety Code.  It noted that some of the provisions contain anti-retaliation provisions and create private rights of action; some have anti-retaliation provisions but only provide for administrative penalties; and one that prohibits retaliation but provides neither an administrative penalty or private right of action.  The Court reasoned that by interpreting the ALFLA to expressly prohibit retaliation but not provide a remedy for retaliation would lead to an absurd result and render the retaliation provisions meaningless.  Therefore, it recognized an implied private cause of action for an employee believing he or she has been retaliated against.

This opinion appears to be in contrast to the longstanding rule in Texas that it is for the Legislature to create new causes of action and not for judicial bodies to do so.  Given the lack of an express private right to file a lawsuit under the statute (when other provisions of the Health & Safety Code provide a remedy), I expect an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court with amicus briefs from the Assisted Living Facility interest and business groups that think a judicially created private cause of action in the absence of express statutory provision providing for such is unsupported by Texas jurisprudence.

You can download a complete copy of the Court's opinion in Emeritus Corp. v. Blanco here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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I keep reading reports that Wal-Mart v. Dukes, where the Court reversed a class certification including 1.5 million women (who worked all over the U.S. under different supervisors at different stores) that was based on the company giving supervisors too much discretion, 125 anecdotal stories and an expert report employing dubious social framework analysis, demonstrates that the Court has a pro-business slant.  (Examples here, here and here).  These articles are prompted largely by the Senate Judiciary hearing held June 29, 2011 entitled "Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court's Recent Rulings will Affect Corporate Behavior."  I disagree that the Court has a pro-business bias in employment discrimination, harassment and retaliation cases.

In the four employment cases heard this term, the Court found for the employee/plaintiff on three of those cases --all retaliation cases.  For example, in Kasten the Court held that employees can engage in FLSA-protected activity by making complaints orally rather than just in writing.  In Thompson, the Court held that an employee who has never engaged in Title VII protected activity can bring a retaliation claim if they are closely associated with another that has engaged in protected activity.  Finally, in Staub, the Court held that an employee can maintain a USERRA retaliation case even where the decision maker is unaware of the employee protected activity if the plaintiff can show that

Dukes is an example of a case that should have never been certified as a disparate treatment (i.e., intentional discrimination) case in the first place.  Nothing more; nothing less.  In fact, Dukes was more of a procedure case than it  ever was an employment discrimination case.  Certainly, it is not proof that the Supreme Court has a pro-business bias.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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The Texas Supreme Court has issued an opinion this morning holding that noncompetition agreements supported by stock options and good will are not unenforceable as a matter of law.  I previewed this case here.  As I have time to digest the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions, I'll provide more thoughts on this case.

You can download the majority opinion here.

Concurring opinion here.

Dissenting opinion here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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The Fifth Circuit held today that a spouse of a successful Title VII plaintiff cannot maintain a legal claim for loss of consortium (i.e., loss of spousal services) under state and federal law.  In Barker, Tracey Barker was a civilian worker employed by Halliburton (aka KBR).  She claimed she was subjected to sexual harassment, retaliation and various other torts while working for Halliburton in Iraq.  She and her husband filed suit in federal district court but the wife's claims were compelled to arbitration and the husband's claims were abated pending the arbitration. 

Ms. Barker won $1.23 million from the arbitrator (reduced from $2.93M) on the Title VII claims but the tort claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment were dismissed.  (Note:  Who says arbitrators don't render large awards in employment cases?).  Mr. Barker's claims were dismissed by the federal district court because it held he could not maintain a claim that was solely derivative of his wife's tort claims where those tort claims had been dismissed by the arbitrator and the only successful claim was under Title VII.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed reasoning that:

Under Texas law, a loss of consortium claim is derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to the physically injured spouse.  Thus, when a husband asserts a loss of consortium claim, he must establish that the tortfeasor was liable for the tort claim of his physically injured wife.  Galen Barker's argument fails for two reasons.  First, Galen Barker's claim must derive from a successful tort claim.  Therefore, in Texas, a loss of consortium claim may not derive from a spouse's federal civil rights claim.  The second reason Galen Barker's argument fails is because the arbitrator dismissed Tracey Barker's tort claims.  Galen Barker's loss of consortium claim must derive from his wife's successful tort claim for her physical injuries.  That is not possible here because the arbitrator dismissed Tracey Barker's tort claims with prejudice.

Consequently, if a Texas employer is faced with an employee-spouse's loss of consortium claim that derive solely from violations of civil rights laws, the employer should consider asking the court to dismiss the spouse's claims. You can download the complete opinion of Barker v. Halliburton here.

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Earlier this week the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected an employee's attempt to create a new wrongful termination cause of action.  In Martin v. Clinical Pathology Lab., Joyce Martin sued her employer for terminating her employment after she requested time off to vote in the November 2008 General Election.  According to her petition, Martin alleged that she:

[W]as a loyal and competent employee of Defendant for three (3) years. On November 4, 2008, Plaintiff requested permission to go vote in the general election so she could cast her vote for the President of the United States and other offices. Defendant refused. Plaintiff left work fifteen minutes early (at 5:15 p.m[.] ) to go vote for change in this country before the polls closed at 7:00 p.m. On November 6, 2008, Defendant terminated Plaintiff.

The question presented in the appeal was "whether an at-will employee who leaves work early to vote in an election and who is subsequently terminated has a private cause of action for wrongful termination."  In keeping with the general rule in Texas that common law exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine should be made by the Supreme Court of Texas, and not the intermediate appellate courts, the Dallas Court of Appeal refused to recognize this new wrongful termination cause of action.

You can download a full copy of the opinion here.

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I have written some of the disadvantages of arbitration over other procedural methods of resolving cases such as waivers of jury trial.  (See post and post).  However, in an opinion from the Supreme Court of Texas, one disadvantage of arbitration (i.e., the limited appellate review of arbitration awards that is available) can be minimized where the parties draft their agreement to apply the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA) rather than the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

In Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, an arbitrator found for the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case.  The arbitration agreement contained a provision limiting the arbitrator's authority such that he lacked "authority (i) to render a decision which contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a cause of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing state or federal law."

The employer sought to vacate the arbitration award claiming that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by rendering a decision containing reversible error.  The issue tackled by the Supreme Court of Texas was whether the TAA precludes an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if not, whether the FAA preempts enforcement of such an agreement.  The Court held that parties may, pursuant to the TAA agree (subject to limits) to expanded judicial review of arbitration awards and that the FAA did not preempt such a conclusion.

Consequently, parties in Texas are free to agree that arbitration awards made subject to state law may be reviewed on a more expanded basis than awards rendered under the FAA.  However, the scope of that expanded judicial review is not without limits.  As the Court stated:

arbitration parties cannot agree to a different standard of judicial review than the court would employ in a judicial proceeding involving the same subject matter.  '[A]n arbitration agreement providing that a 'judge would the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a deal fowl' would be enforceable.'

Moreover, to have a meaning judicial review the Court cautioned parties that they will need to be able to submit "a sufficient record of the arbitral proceedings, and complaints must have been preserved, all as if the award were a court judgment on appeal."  Consequently, some of the perceived advantages of arbitration (i.e., reduced cost, less formal etc.) will have to give way to parties that want to preserve a right to expanded judicial review because proper objections will have to be preserved and a transcript of the proceeding made.  In any event, employers who use arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution made consider making those agreements subject to state law so that they can take advantage of opportunities for judicial review.  Employers should keep in mind that, unlike the FAA, the TGAA requires that agreements to arbitrate personal injury (and like tort claims) be made only after the cause of action has accrued thereby excluding some claims from arbitration that would be covered by the FAA. 

You can access a copy of the concurring opinion here.

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In today's Supreme Court of Texas orders, the Court held that the State of Texas (including its political subdivisions such as counties) is immune from worker's compensation retaliation suits.  You can read a full copy of the Court's opinion in Travis Central Appraisal District v. Norman here.

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The Fair Labor Standards Act is the federal law that requires most employers to pay a minimum wage and overtime.  The FLSA also includes an anti-retaliation provision that prohibits an employer from discharging any employee who has "filed a complaint" under the FLSA because of that complaint.  The issue at the high court in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., was whether an oral complaint constitutes the "filing of a complaint" under the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA.

Kasten filed his suit after his employment ended claiming that he was retaliated against for making oral complaints about the Company's placement of time clocks that Kasten believed had the effect of preventing workers from receiving credit for time spent for donning and doffing work-related protective gear.  In other words, Kasten alleged that he made complaints to his employer that employees were not being paid for all working time as required by the FLSA.  Kasten apparently never put his complaints in writing.  The trial court dismissed Kasten's claim holding that Kasten failed to engage in legally protected activity under the FLSA because the Act did not cover oral complaints. 

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Kasten and held that the FLSA's statutory language prohibiting retaliation for filing a complaint includes oral as well as written complaints. The Court arrived at its decision by interpreting the statutory phrase itself and by taking into account the remedial purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions.  Consequently, when an employee makes an oral complaint about an FLSA violation, he or she has filed a complaint for purposes of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provisions and can bring a suit alleging that he or she was discharged in violation of the Act.

A full copy of the Court's opinion in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. can be accessed here.

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In an issue of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (the federal appellate court hearing cases from Texas), held that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) provides no cause of action for a hostile work environment that is created because of a service member's military service. 

The Plaintiffs, in Carder v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,  alleged that Continental created a hostile work environment through "harassing, discriminatory, and degrading comments and conduct relating to and arising out of" their military service through a continuous pattern of harassment.  They further alleged that "Continental has . . .  chided and derided plaintiffs for their military service through the use of discriminatory conduct and derogatory comments regarding their military service and military leave obligations."  Examples cited in the suit included: 

• placing onerous restrictions on taking military leave and arbitrarily attempting to cancel military leave;
• making derisive and derogatory comments to pilots about their military service such as "If you guys take more than three or four days a month in military leave, you're just taking advantage of the system.";  "I used to a guard guy, so I know the scams you guys are running."; "Your commander can wait.  You work full time for me.  Part-time for him.  I need to speak with you, in person, to discuss your responsibilities here at Continental Airlines."; Continental is your big boss, the Guard is your little boss."; "It's getting really difficult to hire you military guys because you're taking so much military leave."; "You need to choose between CAL and the Navy."

The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the hostile work environment claim concluding that Congress never intended to create such a claim. The Court's rationale was premised on two important points.  First, unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment", USERRA merely covers "benefits of employment".  The Court reasoned that the use of different phrases expressed Congressional intent to cover a narrower set of circumstances that would give rise to a claim than Title VII afforded.  Second, the Court observed  that the Department of Labor had promulgated regulations interpreting USERRA and included no reference to harassment or hostile work environment thereby providing further support that it should not be interpreted as providing such a cause of action.

For these reasons, the Court held that USERRA affords no cause of action for discrimination or harassment based on a hostile work environment theory. You can access the full opinion in Carder v. Continental Airlines, Inc. here.

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Federal law prohibits private employers from terminating the employment of or discriminating with respect to employment against an individual because the individual is or was a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.  In a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court held that the anti-discrimination provisions of the federal bankruptcy code do not provide an an applicant for employment a cause of action against a private employer when the applicant is denied employment solely because of a previous bankruptcy filing.  (Burnett v. Stewart Title). 

The facts of Burnett are straightforward.  Burnett applied for employment with Stewart Title in 2007.  She was offered a job conditioned on the successful completion of a drug screening and background check.  The background check revealed that, in 2006, Burnett filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.  As a result of this bankrupcty filing, Stewart Title rescinded its conditional employment offer.  Burnett sued claiming she was discriminated against in violation of the bankruptcy code. (11 U.S.C. 525).  Section 525(b) provides that:

No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt--

(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act;

(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under this title or during the case but before the grant or denial of a discharge; or

(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.

Applying canons of statutory construction, the Court of Appeals concluded that the act of hiring is not encompassed within Section 525(b)'s prohibition against "discriminating with respect to employment" and therefore, Burnett had no claim.  Consequently, the Court held that "11 U.S.C. 525(b) does not prohibit private employers from denying employment to applicants based on their bankruptcy status."

You can access the full copy of the opinion here.

One caveat, the anti-discrimination provisions of the bankruptcy code do preclude a governmental employer from refusing to hire an applicant solely because of the applicant's prior bankruptcy filings.

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The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered the circumstances when an employer may be liable for employment discrimination based on the unlawful, discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, an ultimate employment decision.   This theory is commonly referred to as the Cat's Paw theory derived from fable about the monkey who convinces the cat to reach into the fire to pull out the roasting chestnuts.  The cat gets burned while the monkey makes off with the chestnuts.  In discrimination cases, the Cat's Paw theory refers to a situation where a supervisor with a discriminatory animus who influences, but does not make, the adverse employment decision.

The facts of Staub are straight forward.  In Staub, the employee complained that several of his direct supervisor were hostile to his reserve military service that periodically required him to miss work.  The employee complained that this hostile supervisors wrote him up on several occasions that were motivated by his military service.  Specially, Staub's direct supevisor issued him a corrective action for violating a company rule requiring him to stay in his work area when he was not working with a patient.  Several months later, a co-worker complained that Staub's frequent availablility.  On another occasion, the hostile supervisor reported that Staub had left his workstation without permission in violation of the earlier corrective action.  A hospital executive, whom had no discriminatory animus, reviewed Staub's file and made the decision to terminate his employment; at least in part on information contained in the file that was initiated by Staub's direct supervisors (and whom allegedly had discriminatory intent).  Staub appealed his termination through the hospital's grievance procedure but the decision stood.  Staub won at trial, but on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal reversed holding that since there was no evidence that the ultimate decisionmaker had a discriminatory animus, Staub could not hold the hospital liable for the discriminatory animus of a supervisor who was not the ulimate decisionmaker. 

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.  As the Court stated, "If the employer's investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action . . . then the employer will not be liable."  However, "the employer is at fault [when] one of its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment decision."  The core holding of the opinion is that "if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under [the law]."

Staub substantially expands the scope of situations where employers can be held liable for discrimination based on the acts of nondecisionmaker supervisors. You can access a full copy of Staub v. Proctor Hospital here.

What others are saying about Staub.

Mrs. Palsgraf and the Cat's Paw Doctrine

With a Friend Like Justice Scalia . . . Cat's Paw Decision Not Very Employer Friendly

The Supreme Court Upholds Cat's Paw Theory of Liability in Anti-Military Discrimination Case

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I've written several posts advocating the advantages of employer's use of waivers of jury trials to resolve employment disputes with employees.  (See posts here and here).  To recap, the mutual waiver of jury trial provides the employer and employee a fair way to resolve employment disputes without some of the disadvantages that other forms of alternative dispute resolution present.  The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recently enforced an employer's agreement with its employee to waive the jury trial of any disputes between them.  

In In re Frank Kent Motor Company, the Court of Appeals found that the waiver of jury trial provisions contained in the employer's handbook, and that the employee was aware of, was enforceable even though the employee argued he did not sign the acceptance of the waiver knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently.  The employee argued that his acceptance of the policy was not knowing and voluntary because he feared he would lose his job if he did not sign the agreement; he wasn't represented by a lawyer when he signed; he refused on two prior occasions to sign the agreement; the agreement was not negotiated and the employer indicated no willingness to negotiate changes; and his supervisor told him he had no choice but to sign the agreement.  Despite these allegations, the Court of Appeals found the allegations insufficient to overcome the presumption that the agreement was knowingly and voluntarily accepted. 

You can find a copy of the full opinion in In re Frank Kent Motor Company here.

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The Supreme Court of Texas has agreed to hear argument in two employment cases. 

In Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha, (No. 10-353) the Court agreed to consider whether the 180-day statute of limitations for a government employee’s complaint about discriminatory pay begins from the date of the first paycheck reflecting the decision or the (earlier) date on which the employee was informed of the decision.

In El Apple I, Ltd. v. Myriam Olivas, (No. 10-0490), the Court will consider the appropriate manner of calculating attorney's fees of a prevailing party in a discrimination case.   

H/T to the Supreme Court of Texas Blog.

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The U.S. Supreme Court announced that employees, who never engaged in protected activity, can bring third-party retaliation claims against their employers when they suffer an adverse employment action due to their connection with a person who has engaged in protected activity.

The facts of Thompson v. North American Stainless are straightforward.  In February 2003 North American Stainless was advised by the EEOC that Miriam Regalado filed a sex discrimination charge of discrimination against it.  Three weeks later, Regalado's fiancee, Eric Thomas, was terminated.  Thomas filed a charge of discrimination of his own alleging that he was fired in retaliation because his fiancee filed a charge of discrimination.  The EEOC found that Thomas had been retaliated against and issued a right to sue letter when conciliation was unsuccessful.

When the case reached the trial court, the judge dismissed the suit finding that Title VII did not recognize third-party retaliation claims.  Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss (prior to any discovery), the reviewing courts were required to take Thomas' allegation as true (i.e., that he was in-fact, terminated for his fiance's charge of discrimination).  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for a different reason.  The Sixth Circuit concluded that Thomas never engaged in protected activity because he didn't filed a charge on his or his fiance's behalf prior to his termination and therefore he couldn't bring a retaliation claim.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  Justice Scalia wrote, in a unanimous opinion (Kagan not participating) that the Court has little trouble concluding that if Thomas was fired because his fiancee filed a charge of discrimination, then he has a claim under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII.  The Court refused, however, to provide a bright line test as to which third-parties might have a claim stating:

We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize. . .   The significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.

 In holding that Thompson had a claim, the Court next concluded that Thompson had standing to sue.  The Court held that a plaintiff within the zone of interest sought to be protected by Title VII (i.e., protecting employees from unlawful actions of employer), has standing to bring a claim against his employer even though the employee had not engaged in protected activity himself.  The Thompson opinion clearly expand the scope of potential plaintiffs that can bring claims against their employers regardless of whether or not they engage in protected activity.

You can read the full opinion here. 

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It is pretty difficult for a party to get an adverse arbitration award reversed or vacated.  A recent Dallas Court of Appeals decision shows the rare instance were such a reversal occurred.  In Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root) --Halliburton, the Dallas court held that an arbitrator's failure to disclose, in an employment discrimination, breach of contract and retaliation case, that he had served as an arbitrator in a prior case involving KBR's party representative and a related company established facts that might create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator's partiality.  Consequently, the court vacated the adverse arbitration award and remanded for a new arbitration proceeding.  You can access the court's opinion here.

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The El Paso Court of Appeals held this week that a Texas employer can use mandamus petition to challenge a trial court's jurisdiction where the plaintiff-employee failed to file his charge of discrimination timely.  A link to the opinion is here. 

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Employers often consider asserting counterclaims against employees who file lawsuits against them.  Most lawyers representing employers counsel against filing counterclaims except in exceptional cases (e.g., an employee’s theft of trade secrets or breach of a covenant not to compete). However, where an employer pays an employee valuable severance benefits in return for a release or a covenant not to sue, the employer may consider avenues to recoup the benefits paid to a former employee who breaches that agreement and sues the employer.  A recent opinion from the Fifth Circuit explains an employer should not generally seek a set-off against damages in a claim seeking unpaid wages or overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the FLSA action. 

In Martin v. Pepsi, Martin was an hourly route settlement clerk for Pepsi for approximately five years. During this time she was paid overtime for the hours she worked in excess of forty hours per week. She was promoted to route settlement supervisor and her manner of compensation was changed to a weekly salary. When Martin was laid off she was provided with nearly $23,000 in severance payments in return for a complete release of claims and a promise not to file any lawsuits or other claims against Pepsi arising from her employment or termination of employment.  After pocketing the severance money, Martin sued Pepsi for unpaid overtime under the FLSA and asserted state law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and punitive damages under state law. Pepsi moved to dismiss Martin’s claims arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The crux of the argument was that because Pepsi was entitled to an off set for the severance payments made to Martin due to her broken promise not to sue Pepsi and the amount of the set-off exceeded the unpaid overtime and liquidated damages Martin could recover, there was no controversy for the court to decide. The trial court agreed and dismissed Martin’s case. 

In reversing the trial court’s dismissal, the Fifth Circuit held that counterclaims seeking damages or set offs against recovery in FLSA cases are not permitted unless the money being set-off can be considered wages that the employer pre-paid to the plaintiff-employee. In Martin, the money that was sought to be set-off against the FLSA overtime was the severance benefits paid in return for a release of claims.

Martin does not appear to foreclose an employer’s ability to maintain a state court lawsuit for breach of contract arising from an employee’s breach of a contract not to sue in return for severance payments. For example, the employer might sue for recession to have the plaintiff return any severance benefits paid to him or for the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending a lawsuit the plaintiff promised he would not file. What is clear is that a counterclaim in the FLSA suit or an affirmative defense seeking a set off against FLSA damages is not the proper way to seek a return of the severance benefits paid to a plaintiff who promised not to sue the employer.

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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals ruled that the provisions of the federal Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 extending the charge filing deadlines for certain pay discrimination claims should not be automatically applied to pay discrimination claims arising under state law.

In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Villanueva, Tamara Villanueva brought suit against the the District for gender-based pay discrimination arising from her failure to receive a five percent pay increase she believed she was entitled.  After being given only a four percent increase in pay, Villanueva hired an attorney who threatened the District  with a gender-based pay lawsuit.  Additionally, immediately after being informed that she would not receive the five percent raise she requested, she started forwarding portions of the District's employment policies from her work e-mail account to her personal e-mail account. 

More than 180 days after Villanueva began forwarding copies of the employment policies to her personal e-mail account and her lawyer's transmission of the demand letter to the District, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission's Civil Rights' Division.  She admitted in her deposition, which was filed along with the District's plea to the jurisdiction (similar to a motion to dismiss), that she believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her gender more than 180 days prior to filing her charge of discrimination.  Ordinarily, this would render her claim under state law untimely.

The District challenged the court's jurisdiction to hear the pay discrimination part of her lawsuit.  The trial court denied the District's plea to the jurisdiction.  On appeal, the District argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the the pay discrimination claim because Villanueva failed to file her administrative complaint within the required 180-day period  after the District committed the unlawful employment practice.  Villanueva countered that the passage of the federal Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 should be automatically read into the Texas Labor Code prohibitions against pay discrimination thereby rendering her claim timely. 

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Villanueva's argument for several reasons.  First, the Texas Legislature considered amending the Texas Labor Code during its 2009 session to incorporate the provisions of the Lilly Ledbetter Act.  That bill was never passed.  Second, when Congress has amended provisions of other federal anti-discrimination laws such as the ADA (amended by the ADA Amendments Act), the Texas Legislature passed similar legislation to adopt or incorporate the changes in federal law.  The appeals court summarized the basis for its holding by stating, "while we are guided by analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them, we see no reason to write automatic incorporation language into Chapter 21 [the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act] when out legislature has shown that it knows how to amend the chapter when it wants to include specific federal provisions."  Consequently, the court of appeals held that Villanueva's pay-discrimination claim was untimely and should be dismissed.

The Villanueva opinion sets up a split of authority among the Texas courts of appeals.  This split may find its way to the Texas Supreme Court for resolution.  See Houston Court of Appeals Says Ledbetter Act Applies to Texas State Law Claims.  Without attempting to predict how the Supreme Court of Texas will resolve the case, I believe the Fort Worth Court's analysis is the proper one.  Meanwhile, the Texas Legislature starts its session in several weeks.  A state law Lilly Ledbetter bill is likely to be reintroduced this Legislative Session.

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The Fifth Circuit issued an important opinion on an issue (i.e., judicial estoppel) that arises frequently when litigating employment disputes.  The issue is whether an innocent bankruptcy trustee is judicially estopped from collecting assets, on behalf of the creditors, that were not disclosed by the debtor in his bankruptcy filings.  The court of appeals held that, like the debtor, the innocent trustee and creditors were also judicially estopped from recovery by the debtor's misconduct. 

The appeal arose from a $1 million-plus judgment an Arlington firefighter obtained against the City  on a claim arising under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict but remanded the case for a recalculation of damages.  You can read the opinion from the original appeal here.  During the appeal of the judgment, the firefighter filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition seeking a discharge of $300,000 in debt.  Importantly, the firefighter failed to disclose million dollar judgment from his bankruptcy filings and schedules leading the creditors, the trustee and the bankruptcy court to believe it was "no asset" case.  The firefighter obtained a discharge of the debt.

When the City learned of the bankruptcy filing, it requested the court of appeals apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the debtor-firefighter from collecting on the judgment.  The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether judicial estoppel applied.  After several evidential hearings, the trial court concluded that the elements of judicial estoppel had been met.  However, because the doctrine of judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the court concluded that it would be inequitable to penalize the trustee and the innocent creditors because of the firefighter's misconduct.  The trial court then fashioned a remedy that permitted the creditors to recover the amounts owed to them, but denied any recovery to the firefighter and ordered that any sums due pursuant to the judgment against the City over and above the debts owed the creditors reverted to the City --not the firefighter. 

The City appealed arguing that the trustee should also be judicially estopped recovering on the undisclosed judgment. The question raised by the appeal is whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents not only the debtor who fails to disclose assets on his bankruptcy schedules, but also the innocent trustee and creditors.  The court held that, to protect the integrity of the judicial process, judicial estoppel bars both the debtor and the trustee from recovering on the assets that were not disclosed.  

You can access a full copy of Reed v. City of Arlington here.  Congratulations to my partner, Mike McConnell, who represented the City of Arlington.

UPDATE:  On August 11, 2011, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel's decision and held that judicial estoppel does not bar a blameless bankruptcy for pursuing a judgment that the debtor concealed during the bankruptcy and that the debtor is barred from pursuing.  You can read a copy of the opinion here.

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In another cable splicer misclassification case arising in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial court decision that Louis Thibault was an independent contractor rather than an employee. Therefore, he was not entitled to overtime under the FLSA.

Thibault owned a business in his home state of Delaware selling picnic tables, storage tables and golf carts. He also owned several rental properties and realized a small income from racing automobiles.  When hurricane Katrina seriously damaged the telephone infrastructure of BellSouth’s grid, Thibault and his friend Bill Peek, drove their RV to Louisiana to perform splicing work on behalf of BellSouth to rebuild the grid.  Peek was an experienced cable splicer but Thibault had never worked as a splicer.  He did have prior experience as a naval aircraft mechanic and according to him easily learned mechanical tasks if shown how to do the task.  Peek taught Thibault the basics of splicing in one evening and Thibault was able to learn the remainder of what he needed to know on the job.

Once in New Orleans, Thibault and Peek worked 14 days shifts (13 days on with 1 day off) 84 hours per week; received a fixed hourly wage ($68 per hour) and were required to provide their own trucks and tools.  BellSouth decided what jobs would be done daily and assigned BellSouth contractors to distribute the assignments. Thibault received his daily assignments from the BellSouth contractor. 

Thibault had intended to work 6-7 months and then return to his home in Delaware. After only three months; however, he was laid off. He earned $51,628 during the three month period. After he was released he sued BellSouth and its contractors for unpaid overtime claiming he was an employee rather than an independent contractor. The trial court concluded that Thibault was an independent contractor and granted summary judgment for the defendants.

A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Applying the economic realities test, the panel found Thibault was not an employee. Significant to its decision was the fact that:

• Thibault owned his own business and therefore did not work exclusively for BellSouth and its contractors;
• Thibault intended to work on 7-8 months and then return to Delaware;
• Defendants considered him an independent contract and many other splicers also considered themselves contractors;
• Splicing required little skill and initiative as evidenced by the fact Thibault learned it in one evening;
• Thibault continued to oversee his primary business during the three months he performed splicing work.

In the panel’s opinion, there was insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to create a genuine issue of material fact that Thibault was an employee. 

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The exercise of sound judgment and the uniform, mechanical application of employment policies are not always synonymous. Every FMLA-covered employer in Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana should be interested in the Fifth Circuit’s most recent FMLA case resulting from an employer’s uniform application of its internal FMLA reporting policy. In Saenz v. Harlington Medical Center, the Court decided, what it characterized as a “close question,” that an employee does not necessarily have to comply with an employer’s internally created, heighted notice provision to maintain FMLA protection and that in some cases the employee need only comply with the FMLA’s more relaxed notice requirements. 

The plaintiff in Saenz, suffered from partial complex epileptic seizures that caused her to lose consciousness and become unable to perform her job. This normally incapacitated her for two days at time. Saenz requested and was granted intermittent FMLA leave for this seizure condition. Her employer, Harlingen Medical Center (“Harlingen”) had a policy that required employees to contact its FMLA administrator not later than two days after each leave period pursuant to the intermittent leave request. Under Harlingen’s policy, failure to provide the required notice could lead to a loss of FMLA protection. In the following six months, Saenz used intermittent FMLA leave eleven times and provided the required notice each time.

Thereafter, Saenz began suffering from depression and bipolar disorder that caused hallucination and disorientation. She was admitted the hospital and later committed to a behavioral center for three days of evaluation. Saenz’s mother contacted her daughter’s supervisor to advise of the symptoms and that Saenz would not be reporting to work.   While at the emergency room (in the same hospital where she normally worked), another Harlingen supervisor personally visited Saenz and observed some of her treatment. In the nine days during which she was incapacitated, Saenz was hospitalized, placed under a judicially created guardianship and eventually released into her mother’s care.

Ten days after first becoming incapacitated, Saenz called Harlingen’s FMLA administrator to advise of her depression/bipolar diagnoses and to discuss the five work absences she suffered as a result of her condition. She also requested approval for intermittent FMLA for these new conditions. Eight days later, Saenz received two letters. The first was from the FMLA administrator advising her that her intermittent FMLA leave request was being processed. The second letter was from Harlingen advising her that her employment was being terminated for excessive absenteeism. The termination letter expressly referenced her failure to comply with the two-day call-in policy. 

Saenz sued Harlingen for violations of the FMLA. The trial court dismissed the case holding that that factual issues existed as to whether the employer could rely on its heightened notice provision, namely, the employer’s actual notice of the severity of Saenz’s condition and the lack of evidence that Saenz affirmatively refused to comply with the company’s heightened noticed provisions. The court of appeals also found that fact issues existed as to whether Saenz gave sufficient notice of her need for leave as soon as practicable as required by the FMLA because the evidence showed that her mother told two supervisors of her hallucinations; at least one supervisor visited her in the hospital emergency room and observed Saenz’s treatment; and her mother stayed in constant contact with the employer as to the status of Saenz’s treatment. Based on these facts and this evidentiary record, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

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I've previously written about the specific requirements that must be included in a covenant not to compete with a licensed physician to make the restrictive covenant enforceable.  The Dallas Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court's decision that a noncompetition agreement between a surgical practice and several limited-partner physicians was unenforceable because the agreement lacked one of the statutorily required provisions.  You can access the Court's opinion in Greenville Surgery Center Ltd. v. Beebe here.  In short, the noncompete lacked the buy-out clause required by the statute.  That defect alone was sufficient to render the noncompetition obligation unenforceable.

Beebe should remind Texas employers that when drafting noncompetition agreements, it is important to have a knowledgeable, Texas attorney review the agreement before having employees or partners sign it.

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In its first FMLA opinion, the Texas Supreme Court held that agencies of the State of Texas cannot be sued for FMLA violations arising out of an employee's FMLA leave taken for his own serious health condition.   In University of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera, the Supreme Court of Texas held that, unlike the family care provisions of the FMLA, Congress did not abrogate Texas' sovereign immunity for violations of the FMLA self-care provision and therefore the State of Texas cannot be sued for such violations.

The underlying facts are as follows.  Alfredo Herrera was an HVAC technician for the University of Texas at El Paso.  Herrera sustained a work-related injury to his elbow requiring a nine month leave of absence.  One month after he returned to work, his employment was terminated.  He sued alleging that he was terminated for taking personal medical leave under the self-care provision of the FMLA and exercising his First Amendment rights by complaining about unsafe work conditions.  UTEP challenged the court's jurisdiction over the claim asserting that it was barred by sovereign immunity.  The trial court and court of appeals found that jurisdiction existed. 

Acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress effectively abrogated state sovereign immunity for the FMLA family-care provisions, the Texas Supreme Court found that there was no evidence in the FMLA legislative history or Congressional findings that women took more personal medical leave (or were thought to do so) than men.  Because, according to the Court, the self-care provisions of the FMLA were not targeted at an identified pattern of gender discrimination on the part of the States, Congress overreached when it attempted to apply the self-care leave provisions to the states. 

While the opinion analyzes complex issues of state sovereignty and Congressional findings, the simple take away from Herrera is that the State of Texas cannot be sued for FMLA violations arising out of an employee's need for leave for self care.   

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The Supreme Court of Texas served up a significant victory for Waffle House in a case holding that a plaintiff alleging both a statutory sexual harassment claim and a negligent supervision and retention claim based on the same conduct is limited to recovering solely on the statutory remedy.  

Here are the facts as reported by the Court.  Cathie Williams worked as a Waffle House waitress for approximately eight months beginning in 2001.  During her employment she was subjected to offensive sexual comments from a  male co-worker cook.  These remarks were sometimes accompanied by physical gestures or attempts at unwelcome flirting.  Additionally, the harasser occasionally pushed Williams into the counters and grill; rubbed his arm against her breast; and on one occasion came up behind her, held her arms and pressed his body against hers.

Williams complained to the restaurant manager, but the conduct did not stop.  Williams then complained to the district manager.  According to Williams, little effort was made to investigate or remedy the offensive conduct.  Williams ultimately resignedly complaining that she was constructively discharged.

Williams filed her lawsuit against Waffle House alleging a statutory sexual harassment claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and a common law negligent supervision and retention claim for retaining the harasser after Williams' complaints.  The jury returned a total verdict on both claims of approximately $3.89 million.  Williams elected her remedies under the common law negligence claim which provided her a greater recovery than the statutory claim (and its caps) allowed.  The trial court ultimately entered judgment in Williams' favor for $900,000.

Waffle House appealed arguing that Williams' common law negligent supervision and retention claims were completely preempted because her exclusive remedy for workplace sexual harassment was the statutory claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.  Waffle House argued that, at a minimum, the damages had to be reduced to reflect the lower damages caps provided for under the TCHRA.

In its analysis, the Court was persuaded that the statutory remedies should be the exclusive remedies under these facts given the comprehensive procedural rules and remedies the Texas Legislature crafted in creating a statutory sexual harassment claim.  Although not specifically articulated, the Court also appeared to be concerned that plaintiffs subjected to workplace harassment might forego the comprehensive administrative procedures under the TCHRA to pursue potentially more lucrative negligence claims, thereby rendering the Texas Workforce Commission's Civil Rights Division less relevant.

The Court held that a sexual harassment plaintiff cannot recover under a negligence theory where the negligence is entwined with the facts of the complained-of harassment.  Stated differently, where the "negligence is rooted in facts inseparable from those underlying the alleged harassment," the plaintiff's sole remedy is a statutory harassment claim.  However, where a negligence claim arises from facts unrelated to the sexual harassment (e.g., assault-based negligence claim), the TCHRA may not necessarily provide the sole remedy. 

You can download the majority opinion and dissent here. 

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Texas courts routinely enforce arbitration agreements between employers and their employees. In most parts of the state, lawyers representing employees agree to go to arbitration upon being presented with a copy of an arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiff-employee. On occasion, however, there are disputes over the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Texas’ recent opinion spotlights another challenge to an employer’s alternative dispute resolution program.

In In re Odyssey Healthcare, Maria Morales sued her El Paso-based employer (and her supervisor) for negligence after she was injured at work when she tripped on an uneven step at a patient’s home. Odyssey is a non-subscriber (i.e., it does not have workers’ compensation insurance) and provides its employees with an “Occupational Injury Benefit Plan.” All Odyssey employees must enroll in the program as a condition of employment. The program requires that all disputes between the employer and employee must be resolved through mandatory, binding arbitration. The arbitration was to be conducted with an arbitrator selected from a panel based in Dallas. The employer reserved the right to modify or terminate the arbitration program, but only after providing the employees with advance notice.

The plaintiff challenged the arbitration program arguing that it was invalid, unenforceable and substantively unconscionable; it violated the Texas Workers Compensation Act’s non-waiver provisions; the Federal Arbitration Act violated the Tenth Amendment by encroaching on a state’s power to enact and regulate its workers’ compensation system; and the agreement was illusory. The Texas Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and grant the motion to compel arbitration.

You can access the full opinion here.

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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that an employer willfully violated the FLSA by excluding “per diem” from the employee’s regular rate of pay and thereby avoiding increased overtime wages. In Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., the employer separated the plaintiff’s compensation into straight time, an hourly per diem payable up to the first 40 hours worked each week, and an hourly overtime rate. After a year of employment, the employee received a “raise” for which the employer increased both the per diem and overtime rate by $1, but not the regular rate of pay.

The employee sued for unpaid overtime under the FLSA, while the employer argued that the overtime rate already exceeded that required and that the per diem should not fall under the regular rate of pay because it equaled reimbursable expenses. Rejecting those defenses, the Court agreed that a per diem could be excluded, but reasoned a legitimate per diem would not vary based on number of hours worked. The employer also tried to offset the back overtime wages by the amount of expenses saved when the employee moved closer to work. The employee’s change in address would have resulted in fewer per diem expenses, but the Court reasoned that since the hourly per diem should have been included in regular rate of pay in the first place, the employer could not offset the overtime pay owed.

Texas employers should review their methods of calculating overtime rates to ensure compliance with the FLSA, and specifically to ensure that per diem pay is included in the regular calculation. Failure to properly calculate these rates may render employers vulnerable to significant liabilities in the form of back overtime wages, attorney fees, costs, and liquidated damages. 

The Editor thanks Chandler Craig, a third year law student at the University of Texas who is clerking for the firm, for drafting this post.

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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded a win the City of Chicago obtained against an African-American class of firefighter applicants seeking positions with the City.  In Lewis v. City of Chicago, a group of firefighter applicants filed a lawsuit against the City challenging the City's 1996 decision that it would only consider those applicants who scored "well-qualified" on the entrance examination.  Applicants who passed the test, but only scored "qualified" were not further considered for employment opportunities.

The plaintiffs challenged their exclusion from the screening process when the City exhausted its pool of well-qualified applicants but failed to begin considering those who scored "qualified" on the test.  The thrust of the plaintiffs' claim was that the arbitrary decision to only consider those "well-qualified" applicants had a disparate impact on racial minorities.  The plaintiffs won at  trial, but their victory was reversed when the court of appeals held that because none of the applicants filed a timely charge of discrimination from the date the decision was made to only hire applicants from the "well-qualified" list, their claims were untimely and barred.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding that a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge of discrimination challenging the adoption of an allegedly unlawful practice may still assert a disparate impact claim in a later charge challenging the employer's use of that practice as long as the plaintiff alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim.  A complete copy of the Court's opinion can be accessed here. 

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In a non-employment case of significant importance to employers and employment lawyers, the U.S. Supreme Court held today that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and is therefore not permitted.  This case arose out of an MDL antitrust case alleging that certain competitors were engaged in a price-fixing scheme.  The parties to the underlying transaction were signatories to an arbitration agreement that was silent on whether the arbitrator had the authority to conduct class action arbitrations. For a more detailed review of the factual and procedural background of the case, see the SCOTUS Wiki on the case here. 

The significance of this case to employers is that many employment agreements containing arbitration provisions are also silent on the issue of class arbitration (and some specifically exclude class action arbitration).  Without doubt this opinion will be used to argue that an arbitrator lacks the authority under the FAA to arbitrate class action employment disputes where the parties' agreement, or other probative evidence, fails to establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate those claims collectively. 

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Yesterday the First District Court of Appeals in Houston issued an opinion I first thought was an April Fool's joke.  However, since this opinion hasn't been withdrawn, I presume the Court was serious in holding that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act , an act of Congress that has the effect of extending the statute of limitations to certain pay practices, applies to claims filed under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.  The Court cites two federal district court opinions similarly holding, but this is the first state court of appeals to apply the federal amendment to Title VII to the state law.  This holding is even more surprising to me given that the Texas Legislature, in its last term, considered adopting provisions similar to the Ledbetter Act, but did not pass those provisions.

The effect of the Houston Court's opinion is to render state law claims that would have been previously time barred as timely. You can read the First District Court of Appeals' decision in Prairie View A & M University v. Chatha here.

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In a discrimination case it is very important to determine whether the plaintiff is alleging direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.  This is important because the standard by which a court determines if the case should proceed to trial or not depends on this determination. In Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the Circuit's test for determining whether an age-related comment constitutes direct evidence of discrimination or is merely a stray remark that may constitute circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 

Jackson, a sixty-nine year old employee, had his employment separated following an internal and external harassment investigation that resulting in a determination that he violated the company's anti-harassment policy.   He brought suit alleging that he was terminated because of his age.  His primary piece of evidence supporting his claim was a comment the decisionmaker allegedly made a year earlier.  According to Jackson, the decisionmaker told another coworker that Jackson was an "old, gray-haired fart" and that the coworker would be in charge when Jackson retired.

As the Court reiterated, to constitute direct evidence of discrimination the comment must 1) relate to the protected class of persons that the plaintiffs belongs; 2) be proximate in time to the complained of adverse employment action; 3) made by a person with authority over the employment decision at issue; and 4) relate to the employment decision at issue. Because the comment was made more than a year before Jackson's termination and did not relate to the decision at issue, the court held the comment did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. 

Absent direct evidence of age discrimination Jackson was forced to prove, by circumstantial evidence, that the company's stated reasons for his termination were false or untrue.  Stated another way, he had to show that the company did not reasonably believe that he violated the anti-harassment policy (sometime referred to as the "honest belief rule").  Given that the company conducted both internal and external investigations and that witnesses of both sex corroborated the claims made against Jackson, there was no evidence that the company did not reasonably believe that he violated the anti-harassment policy nor evidence that the company's stated reasons for terminating Jackson's employment were false.  Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the employer.

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A trial court's order granting or denying a temporary injunction in a noncompete case is rarely reversed by the court of appeals.  This week the Fourteenth Court of Appeals took the unusual step of reversing a trial court's denial of an employer's application for temporary injunction seeking to prohibit a former employee from engaging in certain competitive activities.

In EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, EMS brought suit against its former employee (Shary) to enforce the terms of a noncompetition agreement.  The agreement prohibited, in relevant part, Shary from soliciting any of the company's customers existing as of the date of termination.  The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later held hearings on EMS's application for temporary injunction.  At two temporary injunction hearings the trial court did not take evidence but merely heard oral argument.  Shary argued that the noncompete was overly broad as a matter of law because it was not limited to the customers that he actually dealt with but instead included all customers existing on the date of his termination.  Without taking any evidence, the trial court concluded that EMS had not shown its entitlement to an injunction.

On appeal, EMS argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to take evidence addressing the reasonableness of the restrictions; whether the agreement should be reformed; and whether the restrictions were ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement such as a personal services agreement. 

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the temporary injunction without first hearing evidence.  The appellate court found that the trial court should have heard evidence regarding the reasonableness of the restrictions; the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract; and whether the former employee had dealings with all existing customers of EMS or only part of them.  Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the denial of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

A copy of the opinion is available here.

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Last week, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of an employer on an unemployment benefit eligibility issue where the employee, abandoned his job.  The employee was a Nationwide Financed Agent from January 2003 until November 2005.  A Financed Agent is an employee-agent of Nationwide who starts an insurance agency and operates it to the point of economic self-sustainability.  At that point the Financed Agent becomes an independent contractor. 

In June 2005, the employee's supervisor met with the employee to discuss his poor job performance.  The employee continued to under perform and the employer attempted to meet with the employee on three successive occasions to address the continued poor performance; however, the employee failed to attend those meetings.  Ultimately, the supervisor telephoned the employee and left a message for him to return the call immediately.  The call went unreturned.  Further investigation revealed that the employee had not been to the office in two months and that he had removed computer equipment and all of his personal belongings from the office.  The supervisor wrote the employee to advise that Nationwide considered his employment to have been abandoned. 

The employee filed for unemployment benefits claiming he quit with good cause.  He contended that he quit with good cause because: 1) he was require to work overtime without being paid time -and-a half; 2) he believed he was about to be laid off; and 3) supervisor acted in bad faith to create a record for his eventual discharge.  The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the employer because:

Uranga had been employed by Nationwide from January of 2003 to November 2005. As an agent, Uranga would have a full day but he was able to set his own office hours. Uranga was aware at the time he was hired of the job responsibilities and the required time commitment. When Uranga's job performance became a problem, Scott met with him to discuss the deficiencies in his operation. Uranga's job performance did not improve and Scott attempted to meet with him again, but Uranga did not attend the scheduled meetings. Scott subsequently discovered that Uranga had been absent from the office for most of the two previous months and he had removed computer equipment and personal belongings. Scott determined Uranga had abandoned his employment and wrote Uranga a letter notifying him that Nationwide considered his employment at an end.

Given these facts, there is nothing surprising or controversial about about the fact the appellate court affirmed the conclusion that the claimant resigned without good cause.  Similarly, the opinion doesn't state any new rules of law.  However, the opinion emphasizes a few points about eligibility for unemployment benefits under Texas law including:

• Leaving a job when work is still available (even when a definite notice of layoff is given) constitutes a voluntary resignation.
• Claimant working under objectionable conditions for a prolonged period of time weighs against a finding that his eventual resignation was for good cause.

A copy of the court's opinion is available here.

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There has been a significant amount of litigation against employers over the compensability of work time for putting on and taking off safety-related clothing and equipment prior to the start of a shift but necessary for the work to be performed.  For example, Pilgrim's Pride Corporation recently agreed to pay $1 million in back wages to settle a donning and doffing case with the U.S. Department of Labor.  

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (the federal appellate court hearing appeals from Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana) recently affirmed a trial court judgment in favor of McWane, Inc. (a cast iron pipe and fitting manufacturer) in a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action filed on behalf of 2,100 employees. The lawsuit sought unpaid wages for time spend putting on and taking off safety gear before and after employees' scheduled shift (i.e., hard hats, steel-toed boots, safety glasses and ear plugs). This is commonly referred to as donning and doffing pay. 

Employees at McWane worked at ten different plants. Three of the plants had collective bargaining agreements (CBA) that expressly excluded donning and doffing time from compensable time. The remaining seven plants had CBAs that were silent on the issue of donning and doffing pay. Employees were paid based on “line time,” which measures shift working time as starting when the first item hits the processing line and ends when the last item leaves the processing line. None of the plants had ever paid (in over 40 years) employees for pre-shift donning and doffing time and the issue had never been previously discussed at union meetings or during contact negotiations (and union officials and employees admitted that they never knew pre- and post-shift changing time was potentially compensable under the FLSA). 

The Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires that employees receive overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay. An exception exists for time spent changing clothes if it has been excluded by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement. The McWane employees argued that donning and doffing was subject to exclusion as time worked only when it has been affirmatively bargained away in the labor contract, and therefore no waiver existed in this case because the union representatives did not have knowledge of the right to compensation for this changing time nor any knowledge of or agreement to a policy of nonpayment for that time.

The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments and sided with other courts of appeals to hold that “even where negotiations never included the issue of non-compensation for changing time, a policy of non-compensation for changing time that has been in effect for a prolonged period of time, and that was in effect at the time the CBA was executed, satisfies the [FLSA’s] requirement of ‘ a custom or practice under a bona fide’ CBA.” The Court further held that burden of establishing the absence of a custom or practice under a CBA is on the plaintiff employees and is not an affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof.

Access the opinion here: Allen v. McWane, Inc., No. 08-41037 (5th Cir. 2010)

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In Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston held, in a case of first impression, that an individual cannot be held personally liable for a Sabine Pilot cause of action.  A Sabine Pilot or public policy wrongful termination claim is a narrow exception to the general rule of at-will employment in Texas.  A claim may arise when an employee is terminated by his employer solely for refusing to perform an illegal act.  This type of claim was named after the first Texas Supreme Court case to recognize the cause of action.   See Sabine Pilots Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).

In Physio, the plaintiff's claim arose after her employment was terminated, according to her, for refusing to sign altered patient medical treatment records showing medical services that were never provided and that would have led to higher insurance payments for the employer.  The employer contended that the plaintiff was terminated for various performance infractions, including unauthorized treatment on a patient and misuse of company time.  At trial, the employer and individual defendants elected not to defend the case further due to a lack of resources to pay their attorney.  The trial court conducted a bench trial and found that the plaintiff was terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act and entered judgment against the employer and individual defendants. 

On appeal the individual defendants raised an issue left open by Sabine Pilots and the lower court decisions applying the doctrine --i.e., whether an individual supervisor may be held liable for this type of claim.   The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that individual supervisors (absent a finding that the supervisor was the alter ego of the employer) cannot be held personally liable for a Sabine Pilot cause of action.

Majority Opinion Here

Dissenting Opinion Here

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The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston recently held that it is the date the employee is provided notice of termination, and not the termination date itself, that commences the statute of limitations in a breach of contract case.  You can read the Memorandum Opinion in Malallah v. Noble Logistic Services, Inc. here.

Bader Malallah entered a three year employment contract with Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (“Noble”) that could be terminated earlier, without notice, for certain enumerated acts or omissions. Prior to the end of the three year term, Noble terminated Malallah’s employment. Four years and seven days after Malallah was first advised that his employment was terminated, but less than four years after his termination was memorialized in writing, Malallah sued for breach of contract.

Noble defended the suit on the grounds that the claims was not filed within the four year statute of limitations that applies to breach of contract claims because it was filed more than four years after Malallah was first given notice of his termination. At trial, the jury found that Malallah was terminated without good cause but also found that his termination occurred on March 2, 2001 (the date he was first given any notice of termination) rather than on March 16, 2001 (the date his termination was memorialized in writing). Therefore, despite the jury's finding that Malallah was terminated without good cause, the the trial court found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations based on the jury's answer as to the date of termination and entered judgment for Noble. The Houston Court of Appeals [14^th Dist.] affirmed that judgment.

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