Texas Employment Law Update : Texas Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Russell D. Cawyer : Kelly Hart & Hallman Law Firm : Dallas TX Labor Updates

In a recent pre-ADAA case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a former UPS employee's limitations caused by Type II diabetes were not disabling and that UPS did not fail to provide reasonable accommodation to a known disability.  Despite the fact that this case was based on pre-ADAA law, there are still some useful takeaways that will apply notwithstanding the ADAA.

Rommel Griffin was a 28-year employee of UPS who suffered from Type II diabetes.  He worked in a supervisor/management capacity on the twilight shift from 2 to 10 p.m.  After Hurricane Katrina, Griffin experienced unusual numbness and pain that his doctor attributed to stress.  He took a paid leave of absence to complete an outpatient behavioral counseling program.  After completing this program, Griffin was better able to manage his stress and his symptoms improved.

Griffin was released to return to work and upon his return learned that his job had been filled.  Griffin sought out two other positions; neither of which he was awarded.  Ultimately, he was assigned the position he previously held; albeit on the midnight shift.  Upon being told he was assigned to the midnight shift, Griffin delivered a letter titled "Accommodation Request" where he said that that his doctors required that his schedule be adjusted to daytime hours to accommodate his diabetes.  UPS requested additional information from Griffin and his doctors to evaluate the request for accommodation. 

In response to UPS's request, and key to the court's decision, were Griffin and his doctor's response.  Griffin wrote a letter stating that "My diabetes is a condition that does not have to be a disability if I manage it properly, but to do so I will need UPS to make the accommodation to permit me to work days."  His healthcare provider indicated "No" in response to the question regarding whether Griffin's impairments substantially limited his ability to perform any major life activities other than working.  None of the information provided by the physicians said that Griffin needed daytime work hours.  As a result of this information, UPS denied Griffin's request for accommodation.  Shortly thereafter, Griffin tendered his notice of retirement.  Prior to this retirement, he made no complaints to human resources about the denial of accommodation nor did he participate in UPS's formal dispute resolution program.  Like UPS, the trial court also concluded that Griffin was not disabled and granted judgment in favor of the company.

On appeal, the court reviewed the decision that Griffin was not disabled.   The court noted that Griffin had been able to manage his diabetes for years, without complication, so long as he maintained his regimen of medication, meals and rest.  In this mitigated state, pre-ADAA law, Griffin's impairments could not be considered to be substantially limited.  Importantly, the court observed that neither it, not the Supreme Court, has recognized the concept of per se disabilities and that Griffin's limitations were on the moderate end of the diabetes spectrum thereby not amounting to significant limitations on any major life activity.  Consequently, the court of appeals also found that Griffin was not disabled. 

Similarly, the court also affirmed judgment against Griffin on his failure to provide reasonable accommodation claim.  The court affirmed judgment on this claim because there was no evidence that UPS was unwilling to engage in a good faith, interactive process regarding his request for accommodation.  None of the information submitted by Griffin's doctors requested that he be assigned only daytime hours.  Moreover, Griffin admitted that his diabetes does not have to be a disability if managed properly. 

It should be clear that the Court's analysis of whether Griffin was disabled or diabetes qualifies as a disability has been superseded by the ADAA.  However, there are still some good analysis that survives the changes made in the ADAA.  First, where the information provided by the employee's doctor fails to demonstrate that the employee is disabled or that the particular accommodation requested is necessary because of the employee's disability, the employer does not fail to provide reasonable accommodation to a known disability.  Second, where the employee terminates the interactive process through voluntary resignation or retirement, a failure to provide reasonable accommodation claim is difficult to maintain because it is difficult for the court to determine what measures would have been taken had the accommodation discussions continued.

You can download a full copy of Griffin v. UPS, Inc. here.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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One of North Texas' largest employers announced that it will not longer hire or consider for hire any individual who uses any nicotine product (i.e., cigarettes, nicotine gum or patches, chewing tobacco or electronic cigarettes).  Baylor Health Care Systems announced its new policy on the careers page of its website stating:

As a health care system committed to improving the health of those we serve, we are asking our employees to model the same behaviors we promote to our patients. Beginning January 1, 2012, Baylor will no longer hire individuals who use nicotine products. Applicants who profess to use nicotine will not have their applications processed. Anyone who is offered and accepts a position with BHCS will be tested for nicotine during our regular post-offer pre-employment testing. Applicants who test positive for nicotine will be eliminated from consideration and pending job offers will be rescinded.  We encourage candidates who do not pass the nicotine testing to consider taking steps to stop the use of nicotine and reapply for consideration after a period of 90 days. 

The policy appears to screen out any applicants, regardless of the type of product used containing nicotine and whether the product is use on non-working time off the employer's premises.  Smoking or nicotine dependence has not historically had success in the courts as being a recognized ADA disaiblity.  However, it will be interesting to see if in a post-ADAAA world, where the definition of disability has been greatly relaxed, this policy comes under scrutiny by the EEOC or applicants rejected for employment based on their use of products containing nicotine. 

Baylor is not the first hospital to implement such a policy.  However, similar policies are not without their critics.  The National Workrights Institute, a nonprofit human rights organization focused on workplace issues, has been quoted that "such policies are a slippery slope — that if they prove successful in driving down health care costs, employers might be emboldened to crack down on other behavior by their workers, like drinking alcohol, eating fast food and participating in risky hobbies like motorcycle riding." 

Presumably Baylor had its policy fully vetted by its legal experts and believes it can defend the policy.  However, a quick, admittedly nonexhaustive research search, failed to find any cases holding that nicotine addiction is not a disability under the ADAAA.  Only time will tell whether these kinds of policies will be upheld by the courts.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

Other Articles on Failure to Hire Tobacco Users:

Refusing to Hire Tobacco Users --Valid Argument or Just Blowing Smoke?

Hospital Hiring Goes Up in Smoke.

Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to Smoker Ban

ADA Amendments May Open the Door for Nicotine Addiction Claims

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Verizon agreed to pay $20 million dollars and ceasing using its no-fault attendance policy for  absences caused by impairments qualifying as disabilities under the ADAAA.  Whatever the size of Verizon's Human Resources Department, it looks like its going to need to be a lot larger.

As part of the settlement with the EEOC, Verizon agreed that before it would charge ANY absence against an employee under its no-fault attendance policy, it would determine whether:

• the employee has a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual as defined by the ADA;
• the employee's absence was caused by a disability;
• the employee, or someone else on the employee's behalf, requested a period of time off from work due to a disability;
• the employee's absence have been unreasonably unpredictable, repeated, frequent or chronic;
• the employee's absences are expected to be unreasonably unpredictable, repeated, frequent or chronic;
• Verizon could determine, from the request by or on behalf of the employee or through an interactive reasonable accommodation process, a definite or reasonably certain period of time off that the employee would need because of a disability; and
• the employee's need for time off from work poses a significant difficulty or expense for the business.

Let me say this again; Verizon agreed that it would investigate every single absence before it applies that absence against the employee under its attendance policy.  Don't believe me, here is the link to the consent decree entered in the case.  (Consent Decree).

So, if you are a Human Resources professional in transition or looking for a transition, consider applying at Verizon; its going to need the additional help.

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer

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There's an old saying in rural America that "pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered."  We used the phrase to describe someone who, instead of being satisfied with what he has, gets greedy.  In the litigation context it can be used to describe a party that takes overly aggressive, unreasonable and untenable positions.  My fellow bloggers, Work Blawg and Employment and Labor Insider posts last week about the EEOC's apparent position that attendance is not an essential job function (or not working as Work Blawg refers to it) makes me think the EEOC might be getting a little Hog-like in its attack on employer leave of absence and attendance policies.  The issues comes up in discussions of Verizon's record-setting $20 million settlement with the EEOC over its no-fault attendance policy.  As Robin Shea points describes the dispute that was settled:

The case was about charging absences under a no-fault attendance policy to employees who missed work because of medial conditions that were 'disabilities' within the meaning of the ADA.  It does not appear that medical leaves were at issue.  Exempting ADA conditions from no-fault attendance policies is a huge deal.

With the Verizon settlement, the EEOC is apparently signaling that it believes an employer commits a violation of the ADA when it charges an employee absence against a no-fault attendance policy when the absence results from a medical condition that qualifies as a disability.  Because the ADAAA now renders everyone disabled, the EEOC's position is troubling.  It suggests that the EEOC believes that attendance is not an essential function of most jobs. 

The problem with the EEOC's position (and where it crosses the line from being piggish to hoggish) is that the ADAAA made no changes to what is considered an essential job function or the well-settled standard that an employer need not eliminate essential job functions in providing reasonable accommodation.   Certainly, the ADAAA has given the EEOC ample reason to be aggressive in litigating issues on what constitutes a disability or is a substantial limitation on a major life activity.  However, the ADAAA made no changes to the statute regarding what constitutes reasonable accommodation or essential job functions.  Most courts have held that attendance is an implicit, essential job function of most employment.  Consequently, the EEOC's position that attendance is not an essential job function and employees cannot consider absences caused by "disabilities" under no fault attendance policies is puzzling.  If accepted by the Courts, the EEOC's position would require employer's to investigate each and every absence to determine whether the employee is disabled and whether absence was caused by a disability. 

Follow me on Twitter @RussellCawyer.

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There has been a lot of ink spilled and kilobytes written about how the ADA Amendments Act has substantially expanded the rights of individuals with disabilities to seek and obtain reasonable workplace accommodations.  (See post, post, post, and post).  The increase in the number of applicants and employees who qualify for reasonable accommodations and the types of impairments that now qualify as disabilities has me thinking about the unintended consequences arising with such broad and encompassing changes to the ADA.  Today I read about a potential consequence I had not been able to imagine. 

Elie Mystal wrote yesterday at Above the Law about an employee in Brazil sued and won the right to watch pornography and masturbate because she suffers from "a chemical imbalance that triggers severe anxiety and hypersexuality."  This started me thinking, could the EEOC bring the same suit against a U.S. employer on behalf of an employee who wanted breaks to watch pornography and otherwise relieve his or her stress caused by severe anxiety or hypersexuality (i.e., to masturbate)?  I think the answer, despite what Congress intended, is probably "yes".

First, is hypersexuality or severe anxiety a disability?  The ADAAA regulations say that "depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, OCD, and schizophrenia" are presumptively disabling disorders.  Severe anxiety is a recognized psychological disorder listed in the current version of the DSM and hypersexuality is a proposed diagnosis for the the DSM-V.  (check) 

Second, does it substantially affect a major life activity?  The EEOC's regulations instruct that whether a major life activity is substantially limited is not a demanding standard and should be viewed expansively.  Furthermore the Commission regulations include concentrating, thinking and the operation of the major bodily systems including the reproductive system as major life activities. Therefore, it should not be hard to imagine evidence that these disorders cause the employee difficulty with thinking, concentrating or the normal operation of the reproductive systems.  Moreover, how would an employer challenge whether these impairments and the preoccupations it causes limits the employee's ability to think or concentrate?  (check)

Third, are reasonable break times to relieve stress reasonable?  Unless the employer can show undue hardship, probably so.  Employees are permitted reasonable break times for reasons caused by other physical impairments such as frequent restroom breaks for impairments affecting the urinary or digestive systems; and frequent meal or break times for diabetics who need to test their blood sugar and eat small meals.  Consequently, it would be up to the employer to show that the requested accommodation is not reasonable and/or it causes an undue hardship.  (check).

Having concluded that the EEOC could bring this lawsuit under the ADA on behalf of a employee or applicant, I recognize that the likelihood of it doing so is less than zero; the political fallout would be disastrous for the Commission.  Just because the EEOC would not bring the suit, however, would not prevent an employee from hiring private counsel and bringing the same claim against his or her employer.  This example demonstrates just how far the ADAAA has gone to expand what qualifies as a disability.  Did Congress go too far when it passed the ADAAA?

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For more than 15 years Texas employers have used the application of uniformly enforced neutral absence control policies setting a maximum duration an employee can be away from work as a defense to workers' compensation retaliation claims.  The defense was first solidified by the Supreme Court of Texas in in its 1996 Continental Coffee Prod. v. Casarez case.  See 944 S.W.2d  (Tex. 1996).  Employers who end the employment relationship with a worker's compensation claimant for violating reasonable absence control rule will not normally be liable for workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claims if rule is uniformly enforced (i.e., it is applied to all types of absences and not just those arising from on-the-job injuries).  Following Casarez Texas employers routinely included neutral policies setting forth neutral absence control policies that set maximum durations of time for employees to be away from work (excepting from the maximum duration certain types of statutory protected leaves like FMLA and USERRA leave).

The continuing viability of the neutral absence control policy is in jeopardy with the passage of the ADA Amendments Act.  The ADA Amendments Act substantially expanded the number of employees who can claim disabled status and are therefore entitled to reasonable accommodation.  Reasonable accommodation may include modification of employer policies that might enable the employee to be able to return to work --including, perhaps, an extension of a leave of absence past the maximum set forth in the employer's written policies.

The EEOC has been targeting inflexible leave of absence policies as violating the ADA with greater frequency.  Last September the EEOC sued UPS challenging the company's policy of allowing a maximum 12 months of medical leave claiming that the policy does not adequately accommodate employees with disabilities.   The EEOC also sued Supervalue, Inc./Jewel-Osco over their leave of absence policies that limited the amount of leave an employee could take and challenged another policy that limited participation in the employer's light duty program to only those employees recovering from a work-related injury --something court's had previously held was permissible.  The EEOC also challenged another leave of absence policy it characterized as "inflexible" on behalf of a pregnant employee against D.R. Horton by using the ADA rather than the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Indicating that the EEOC's efforts are having some success, the EEOC recently obtained a consent degree against Sears and a $6.2 million settlement of ADA claims arising from Sear's use of an inflexible workers' compensation leave of absence policy that terminated the 235 employees upon the exhaustion of the leave of absence period. Clearly, inflexible neutral leave policies having setting forth maximum durations for leaves of absence are in the cross-hairs of the EEOC.

The ADA Amendments Act and challenges to neutral absence control and maximum duration of leave policies put Texas employers to a Hobson's choice.  The uniform, mechanical application of such policies provide an employer a defense to a Texas workers' compensation retaliation claim.  Now, however, the policy might give rise to a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability who needs an extension of the maximum leave period to return to work.  Employers should reevaluate their leave of absence policies to make sure they are sufficiently flexible as to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities.  By making exceptions to neutral absence control or maximum duration of leave policies, the exceptions may dilute the protections those policies once provided against workers' compensation retaliation claims.  

Photo courtesy of Sharon Ellman, Ellman Photography.

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The EEOC recently published proposed regulations designed to implement provisions of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA). The proposed regulations incorporate significant changes to the law and provide numerous illustrative examples. A full copy of the proposed regulations can be accessed here.  The following sections summarize some of the significant points.

Presumptively Disabling Impairments

The proposed regulations provide a list of impairments that the EEOC believes will consistently qualify as disabilities. These include: deafness, blindness, intellectual disability (formerly termed mental retardation), partially or completely missing limbs, mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair, autism, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy HIV or AIDS, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, major depression, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, or schizophrenia. 

Conversely, the proposed regulations also identify several impairments that, when temporary or of short duration and having little residual effects, will not normally constitute disabilities. These include: common cold, seasonal or common influenza, a sprained joint, minor and non-chronic gastrointestinal disorders, or a broken bone that is expected to heal completely).

Substantially Limiting Impairments

The regulations suggest that whether an individual has a disability should not demand extensive analysis. In determining whether a physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the proposed regulations direct that ameliorative or other mitigating measures (e.g., medication, medical supplies, learned behaviors, assistive technologies, surgical interventions or reasonable accommodations) should not be considered in determining whether the impairment is substantially limiting. Furthermore, for episodic or impairments in remission, the inquiry is whether the impairment would limit a major life activity when active.

Major Life Activities

The proposed regulations expand the definition of “major life activities” through two non-exclusive lists. The first list includes activities such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.

The second list focuses on the body systems and functions and includes functions of the immune system, special sense organs, and skin; normal cell growth; and digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, and reproductive functions.

With respect to working as a major life activity, the proposed regulations jettison the concept that an individual must be substantially limited in the ability to perform a broad range and class of jobs for working to constitute a major life activity. Instead, the proposed regulations direct that the ability of the individual to meet the qualifications for the type of work at issue is the proper inquiry.

Regarded As Disabled and Reasonable Accommodations

The proposed regulation eliminate the requirement that an individual demonstrate the employer regarded the individual as disabled. Rather, if the individual is subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA because of an actual or perceived impairment, that alone will be sufficient to establish the individual is regarded as disabled. 

The proposed regulations also clarify that individuals who are solely disabled under the “regarded as” prong are not entitled to reasonable accommodations.

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A federal appellate court with jurisdiction over Texas held that chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) may qualify as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the Centers for Disease Control, CFS is characterized by symptoms including weakness, muscle pain, impaired memory and/or mental concentration, insomnia, and post-exertional fatigue lasting more than 24 hours.  There is no known diagnostic test for CFS and physicians are left to rely on forensically unreliable self-reports of the patient to make this diagnosis.   Notwithstanding this inability to test for or confirm the existence of this "syndrome," the federal court of appeals covering Texas held that CFS might qualify as a disability that an employer must reasonably accommodate. 

In EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., L.P., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of Chevron on an employee's claim that she was discriminated against and denied reasonable accommodation for her chronic fatigue syndrome.

The employee, Lorin Netterville, was first diagnosed with CFS in 1987 while attending school and caring for her children at home.  She received a six-week course of treatment and her symptoms disappeared.  In late-2000 Netterville applied for employment with Chevron and was eventually hired.  As part of the employment process Netterville completed a medical history questionnaire, where she failed to disclose a history of excessive fatigue with work or exercise.

Several years later Netterville was required to work long hours of overtime that included manually packing boxes and moving supplies as part of Chevron's office relocation. Netterville claims she begin to suffer sleep disruptions that included getting no more than 1-2 hours of sleep per night for 6-7 days at a time.  Once a month she claimed she would sleep 17 hours straight.  She also claims she "began to run low-grade fevers and to suffer from headaches, disorientation, pain in her temples, stiff joints, pain in her arms and legs, and numbness in her legs, as well as aphasia and problems with memory, concentration and decision-making at times she was unable to remember even her own son's name."  She became unable to sit or walk for more than thirty minutes at a time, was hypersensitive to light and sound, and experienced episodic crying spells and feelings of social isolation.  Approximately 1 year after her symptoms reoccurred Netterville was living with her sister who assisted her with daily living tasks like shopping, cooking, washing, showering, drying, dressing, and using the bathroom.  This assistance was primarily needed because of excruciating pain in Netterville's arms and morning nausea she experienced.

Netterville's physician suggested that she take a month off from work.  Because Netterville could not afford a month off without pay, she got her doctor to write a note advising for a two week break from work.  When Netterville presented her request to Chevron for the 2 weeks of time off, she inaccurately reported that her symptoms had reappeared 2 years earlier.  Because Netterville was hired by Chevron less than 2 years earlier, the company also began investigating whether Netterville had falsified her medical history questionnaire in addition to considering her leave request.  Ultimately Netterville was given her two weeks of leave.

Netterville's physician conditioned her release to return to work on additional accommodations.  He recommended that she be relocated to an office closer to her home.  Additionally, due to her alleged hand pain and concentration difficulties, the doctor also advised that Netterville needed to be in a job that allowed for alternate typing and reading rather than reading and typing for extended periods of time.  She also needed to be able to take a short nap during her lunch break.  When Netterville made these requests to her supervisor, he remained silent.  She was allowed, however, to return to work, and she was provided the accommodations she requested during her final 4 days at work.  Ultimately, Netterville was terminated for falsifying information on her medical questionnaire.

The EEOC filed a lawsuit on Netterville's behalf.  Relying heavily on EEOC-promulgated regulations and its compliance manual (the EEOC is one of the governmental agency litigants that gets to write the authority it then asks a court to rely on to find in its favor --something no private employer is allowed to do), the court of appeals held that Netterville was entitled to a jury trial on her claims because there were fact issues as to whether Netterville had a disability; whether she was terminated for a disability; and whether Chevron provided reasonable accommodation.

This case is an important reminder that any physical or mental impairment may qualify as a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity. Moreover, the major life activity substantially limited need have no bearing on an employee’s employment or performance of his or her job duties. With the passage of the ADA Amendments Act that substantially broadens the coverage of individuals with disabilities, expect more denials of and reversals of employer summary judgments in ADA cases.

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