Mega class-actions attempting to adjudicate discrimination claims on behalf of thousands or tens of thousands of class members are often fundamentally unfair to employers and violate their right to due process. The recent $250M jury verdict against Novartis (5,200 potential class members) and the affirming of a class certification order of up to 1.5 million Wal-Mart workers for various pay and promotional practices highlight the threat that mega-class actions can pose to large employers.

Large class actions adjudicating the claims of hundreds or thousands of employees may be fairly tried when they adjudicate a specific, objective written policy of an employer and significant variables are absent.  However, when large class actions attempt to adjudicate claims involving inherently subjective components (such as unwritten rules or practices with dozens, if not hundreds of variables); individual issues must predominate.  This is especially true when the issue may involve hundreds or thousands of discrete decisions made by different decision-makers (e.g., promotions or job assignments).  A class trial of thousands of discrimination claims tends to devolve into evidence of the personal experiences of a hand-full of class representatives based on a few anecdotal (and usually extreme) examples of conduct (e.g., the Novartis baby-carriage rhyme).  This process deprives an employer of being able to defend the individual employment decisions on a case-by-case basis and sacrifices the employer’s right to due process in the name of perceived efficiency or economy.  

 

The trial of a mega-class action to adjudicate the claims of 1.5 million employees reminds me of Isaac Asimov’s 1955 short story "Franchise".  In Franchise, a futuristic United States turns to electronic democracy. Rather than conducting political elections, a supercomputer, Multivac, selects a single "most representative" person from the population. Multivac then questioned the “most representative” person to determine the overall electorate orientation. All elected offices are then filled by candidates the computer deems acceptable to the populace as determined by the "most representative" person.

 

It would be fundamentally un-American to choose our elected officials by selecting a "single most representative" voter.  It similarly violates fundamental notions of due process and fairness to hold employers liable for wide-spread, systematic discrimination involving dozens of variables in a trial that considers the stories of only a handful of the potential class members.  Courts should reexamine whether an employer’s due process rights can be adequately preserved in the collective adjudication of mega-class action of discrimination claims.

The Supreme Court of Texas served up a significant victory for Waffle House in a case holding that a plaintiff alleging both a statutory sexual harassment claim and a negligent supervision and retention claim based on the same conduct is limited to recovering solely on the statutory remedy.  

Here are the facts as reported by the Court.  Cathie Williams worked as a Waffle House waitress for approximately eight months beginning in 2001.  During her employment she was subjected to offensive sexual comments from a  male co-worker cook.  These remarks were sometimes accompanied by physical gestures or attempts at unwelcome flirting.  Additionally, the harasser occasionally pushed Williams into the counters and grill; rubbed his arm against her breast; and on one occasion came up behind her, held her arms and pressed his body against hers.

Williams complained to the restaurant manager, but the conduct did not stop.  Williams then complained to the district manager.  According to Williams, little effort was made to investigate or remedy the offensive conduct.  Williams ultimately resignedly complaining that she was constructively discharged.

Williams filed her lawsuit against Waffle House alleging a statutory sexual harassment claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and a common law negligent supervision and retention claim for retaining the harasser after Williams’ complaints.  The jury returned a total verdict on both claims of approximately $3.89 million.  Williams elected her remedies under the common law negligence claim which provided her a greater recovery than the statutory claim (and its caps) allowed.  The trial court ultimately entered judgment in Williams’ favor for $900,000.

Waffle House appealed arguing that Williams’ common law negligent supervision and retention claims were completely preempted because her exclusive remedy for workplace sexual harassment was the statutory claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.  Waffle House argued that, at a minimum, the damages had to be reduced to reflect the lower damages caps provided for under the TCHRA.

In its analysis, the Court was persuaded that the statutory remedies should be the exclusive remedies under these facts given the comprehensive procedural rules and remedies the Texas Legislature crafted in creating a statutory sexual harassment claim.  Although not specifically articulated, the Court also appeared to be concerned that plaintiffs subjected to workplace harassment might forego the comprehensive administrative procedures under the TCHRA to pursue potentially more lucrative negligence claims, thereby rendering the Texas Workforce Commission’s Civil Rights Division less relevant.

The Court held that a sexual harassment plaintiff cannot recover under a negligence theory where the negligence is entwined with the facts of the complained-of harassment.  Stated differently, where the "negligence is rooted in facts inseparable from those underlying the alleged harassment," the plaintiff’s sole remedy is a statutory harassment claim.  However, where a negligence claim arises from facts unrelated to the sexual harassment (e.g., assault-based negligence claim), the TCHRA may not necessarily provide the sole remedy. 

You can download the majority opinion and dissent here. 

Texas courts routinely enforce arbitration agreements between employers and their employees. In most parts of the state, lawyers representing employees agree to go to arbitration upon being presented with a copy of an arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiff-employee. On occasion, however, there are disputes over the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Texas’ recent opinion spotlights another challenge to an employer’s alternative dispute resolution program.

In In re Odyssey Healthcare, Maria Morales sued her El Paso-based employer (and her supervisor) for negligence after she was injured at work when she tripped on an uneven step at a patient’s home. Odyssey is a non-subscriber (i.e., it does not have workers’ compensation insurance) and provides its employees with an “Occupational Injury Benefit Plan.” All Odyssey employees must enroll in the program as a condition of employment. The program requires that all disputes between the employer and employee must be resolved through mandatory, binding arbitration. The arbitration was to be conducted with an arbitrator selected from a panel based in Dallas. The employer reserved the right to modify or terminate the arbitration program, but only after providing the employees with advance notice.

The plaintiff challenged the arbitration program arguing that it was invalid, unenforceable and substantively unconscionable; it violated the Texas Workers Compensation Act’s non-waiver provisions; the Federal Arbitration Act violated the Tenth Amendment by encroaching on a state’s power to enact and regulate its workers’ compensation system; and the agreement was illusory. The Texas Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and grant the motion to compel arbitration.

You can access the full opinion here.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that an employer willfully violated the FLSA by excluding “per diem” from the employee’s regular rate of pay and thereby avoiding increased overtime wages. In Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., the employer separated the plaintiff’s compensation into straight time, an hourly per diem payable up to the first 40 hours worked each week, and an hourly overtime rate. After a year of employment, the employee received a “raise” for which the employer increased both the per diem and overtime rate by $1, but not the regular rate of pay.

The employee sued for unpaid overtime under the FLSA, while the employer argued that the overtime rate already exceeded that required and that the per diem should not fall under the regular rate of pay because it equaled reimbursable expenses. Rejecting those defenses, the Court agreed that a per diem could be excluded, but reasoned a legitimate per diem would not vary based on number of hours worked. The employer also tried to offset the back overtime wages by the amount of expenses saved when the employee moved closer to work. The employee’s change in address would have resulted in fewer per diem expenses, but the Court reasoned that since the hourly per diem should have been included in regular rate of pay in the first place, the employer could not offset the overtime pay owed.

 

Texas employers should review their methods of calculating overtime rates to ensure compliance with the FLSA, and specifically to ensure that per diem pay is included in the regular calculation. Failure to properly calculate these rates may render employers vulnerable to significant liabilities in the form of back overtime wages, attorney fees, costs, and liquidated damages. 

 

The Editor thanks Chandler Craig, a third year law student at the University of Texas who is clerking for the firm, for drafting this post.

The U.S. Department of Labor has issued revised regulations dealing with child labor in non-agricultural employment.  The new regulations take effect on July 19, 2010.  The new regulations specify the kinds of employment that minors may perform and the hours in which they can perform the work.  Any Texas employer employing individuals age 18 or younger should closely review these new child labor regulations to ensure that the child workers are engaged in appropriate activities.  You can access a full copy of the revised regulations here.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded a win the City of Chicago obtained against an African-American class of firefighter applicants seeking positions with the City.  In Lewis v. City of Chicago, a group of firefighter applicants filed a lawsuit against the City challenging the City’s 1996 decision that it would only consider those applicants who scored "well-qualified" on the entrance examination.  Applicants who passed the test, but only scored "qualified" were not further considered for employment opportunities.

The plaintiffs challenged their exclusion from the screening process when the City exhausted its pool of well-qualified applicants but failed to begin considering those who scored "qualified" on the test.  The thrust of the plaintiffs’ claim was that the arbitrary decision to only consider those "well-qualified" applicants had a disparate impact on racial minorities.  The plaintiffs won at  trial, but their victory was reversed when the court of appeals held that because none of the applicants filed a timely charge of discrimination from the date the decision was made to only hire applicants from the "well-qualified" list, their claims were untimely and barred.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding that a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge of discrimination challenging the adoption of an allegedly unlawful practice may still assert a disparate impact claim in a later charge challenging the employer’s use of that practice as long as the plaintiff alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim.  A complete copy of the Court’s opinion can be accessed here. 

In a non-employment case of significant importance to employers and employment lawyers, the U.S. Supreme Court held today that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and is therefore not permitted.  This case arose out of an MDL antitrust case alleging that certain competitors were engaged in a price-fixing scheme.  The parties to the underlying transaction were signatories to an arbitration agreement that was silent on whether the arbitrator had the authority to conduct class action arbitrations. For a more detailed review of the factual and procedural background of the case, see the SCOTUS Wiki on the case here. 

The significance of this case to employers is that many employment agreements containing arbitration provisions are also silent on the issue of class arbitration (and some specifically exclude class action arbitration).  Without doubt this opinion will be used to argue that an arbitrator lacks the authority under the FAA to arbitrate class action employment disputes where the parties’ agreement, or other probative evidence, fails to establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate those claims collectively. 

In March 2010, the President signed the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (“HIRE Act”). The law was part of a $17.6 billion jobs creation package that includes incentives for businesses to hire unemployed workers. This law provides Texas employers with an opportunity to reduce some of their payroll tax obligations for 2010.

The HIRE Act provides, among other things, an exemption for the employer’s share of Social Security payroll taxes in 2010 (normally 6.2 percent for the first $106,800 of wages) for each eligible employee that is hired between February 3, 2010 and January 1, 2011. To qualify for the exemption, the employee must: 1) swear that he did not work more than 40 hours during the last 60 days; and 2) not replace another employee except one who voluntarily resigned or was terminated for cause.  Additionally, the eligible employee must not be related to the employer.  The IRS has published an affidavit for use by eligible employees. (Form W-11).  The affidavit is not filed with the IRS but is retained by the employer to justify the use of the exemption in the event of an IRS audit.

Additionally, the law provides a tax credit for retaining employees. Employers that retain newly hired employees for at least 52 consecutive weeks can claim a tax credit on their 2011 tax returns if they meet certain conditions.  To be eligible for the tax credit (i.e., a dollar for dollar reduction in tax), the employee must: 1) be employed for 52 consecutive weeks; and 2) the employee’s wages in the last 26 weeks of the 52 week period must be at least 80 percent of his wages during the first 26 weeks of the period. The tax is capped at the lesser of $1,000 or 6.2 percent of the employee’s wages during the 52 week period. These provisions provide an opportunity for an employer to reduce its payroll tax obligations during this period of economic recovery in 2010.

 

For more information, see these links:

 

Two New Tax Benefits Aid Employers Who Hire and Retain Unemployed Workers

HIRE Act: Questions and Answers for Employers

Special Payroll Tax Exemption Form Now Available

 

Last summer, I detailed the Dallas Court of Appeals’ decision in Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook where the court held a noncompetition agreement supported only by stock-options as consideration was unenforceable.  You can read that post here. Today, the Supreme Court of Texas announced that it would hear the appeal from the Dallas Court of Appeals.  You can view the order list here.  

Review of the Cook case gives the Court an opportunity to extend (or break) its streak of easing the standards for enforcement of restrictive covenants in Texas that I have previously detailed.  (Post here).

Last week the EEOC issued two Informal Discussion Letters addressing employment practices or policies that might create liability under a disparate impact theory of discrimination.  Since the discussion letters do not constitute official opinions or interpretations of the Commission, the significance of back-to-back letters on the same topic is not the content (the letters do not break any new legal ground or make any surprising pronouncements), but that it suggests the Commission might be interested in finding and bringing more disparate impact claims.  The following is a brief summary of the discussion letters.

The first letter dated February 19, 2010, discusses whether a proposed qualification standard that Public Health Directors possess a master’s degree, without the possibility of substituting experience or other education, violates Title VII.  The Attorney-Advisor of the Office of Legal Counsel noted that if the master’s requirement had a significant disparate effect on a protected group, it might be unlawful if the employer cannot justify that the requirement is "job related and consistent with business necessity" and there is no alternative practice "that would be equally effective in predicting job performance, but that would not disproportionately exclude the protected group."

The second letter dated March 9, 2010, discusses employers’ use of credit checks to screen job applicants.  While acknowledging that the EEOC has no authority to enact legislation to prohibit employer credit checks, its authority does extend to circumstances where an employer’s use of credit information disproportionately excludes minority candidates and the employer was unable to show that the practice was needed to operate safely or efficiently.  The Commission’s Assistant Legal Counsel also noted that in May 2007, an attorney who primarily represents class action plaintiffs against employers testified that "credit checks have not been shown to be a valid measure of job performance."  Including a reference in the discussion letter to testimony opining that credit checks do not effectively predict job performance (and then posting the letter on the Commission’s website) suggests that some at the Commission may share a similar view about the use of credit checks to screen applicants.   

While these Informal Discussion letters do not constitute a written opinion or interpretation of the EEOC they are instructive in that they highlight an issue that the EEOC is focusing at least some of its resources.